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The Federal Key to the
Judiciary Act of 1789
Henry J. Bourguignon
I. INTRODUCTION
James Wilson, one of the most influential drafters of the Constitution in
1787, during the ratification debate coined a label for the type of government
created by the new Constitution. He called it a federal republic.' During this
debate James Winthrop, a strong opponent of the new Constitution, writing
under the name Agrippa also called the ideal government a federal republic.'
For Winthrop, however, this ideal government already existed under the
Articles of Confederation. When President Thomas Jefferson spoke at his
inauguration in 1801, he proclaimed, "We are all republicans-we are all
federalists. "I
Jefferson's blithe assertion strikes us today as the prototype of a political
platitude, a call for national unity after a bitterly partisan campaign. Jefferson,
however, seems naively to have believed that all his countrymen, even those
federalists who had fought with such personal enmity against his election,
would soon realize that they too were republicans.4 The language of Wilson
and Winthrop suggests Jefferson's words would have rung true at the time of
the debate over the ratification and founding of the new constitutional
government. In 1788 and 1789, his words accurately reflected the views of
the vast majority of politically involved individuals. Virtually all political
leaders believed in federalism, even though vast gulfs of interpretation
separated their individual positions; they also thought of themselves as
republicans, which also had different meanings for different individuals.
* Professor of Law and Distinguished University Professor, University of Toledo College of
Law. Copyright 0 1994 H. J. Bourguignon.
I greatly appreciate the comments, suggestions and criticism of William R. Casto, Wythe
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1. [Mercy 0. Warren], Observations On the New Constitution and on the Federal and State
Conventions by a Columbian Patriot in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 275 (Herbert J.
Storing, ed., 1981).
2. Letter from James Winthrop to the Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 14, 1988), in 4 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 94.
3. Quoted in STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM, 753 (1993).
4. Id. at 753-54.
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Thus, this broad and embracing umbrella concept of a federal republic covered
widely divergent views and opinions.
These two concepts, federalism and republicanism, did not identify two
philosophies or ideologies, and in 1789 they certainly did not refer to political
parties as the terms slowly came to mean after 1793 or 1794. Rather, these
terms constituted an intellectual frame of reference for viewing and questioning
political developments, a widespread consensus for interpreting basic issues of
government, and a widely shared and generally accepted vocabulary for
political discourse. Thus, federalism and republicanism could embrace the
divergent attitudes and conclusions of different political spokesmen, such as
Wilson and Winthrop. Because their contours remained vague and ill-defined,
the two terms provided a possibility of common discourse, compromise, and
consensus.
Virtually all educated leaders of the founding generation considered
themselves true republicans. According to the American view of republican-
ism, only active and selfless participation in the political process could
preserve the liberty of the people. The people must be represented in
government by individuals who sought the good of the republic rather than
their own personal gain. The common good was viewed as the good of all the
people who made up the republic. Although republics could be destroyed
from within, the surest protection for a republic was the virtue of its citizens.
Republics, like nature, were subject to the inherent laws of growth, ripeness
and decline, or corruption. For republics to survive, civic virtue must prevail.
Most of the citizens believed that the surest sign of a republic's corruption and
enfeeblement was the luxury of the ruling few. The people's liberty could
only be preserved by disinterested, virtuous leaders who sacrificed all while
they sought only the common good of the people. Republicans believed that
"Frugality, industry, temperance, and simplicity-the rustic traits of the
yeoman-were the stuff that made a society strong.' But when they sought
leaders for their new republic, they looked to men like George Washington,
the embodiment of selfless civic virtue. "[UjItimately the most enlightened of
that enlightened age believed that the secret of good government and the
5. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787,52 (1969).
See also id. 46-82. For other standard sources on republicanism, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION (1975); CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN:
STUDIES IN, THE TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL
THOUGHT FROM THE RESTORATION OF CHARLES II UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN
COLONIES (1959); Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q., 49 (1972).
For a recent historiographic essay, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: the Career of a
Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992).
[Vol. 46:647
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protection of popular liberty lay in ensuring that good men-men of character
and disinterestedness-wielded power."6
Just as republicanism was all-pervasive in the political idiom of the day,
so also practically everyone at least paid lip service to the reality if not the
word, federalism. By the time the Constitution was formulated at the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787, political leaders generally took for granted
the native-grown vision of shared governmental power in a federal union.
Almost all the delegates in Philadelphia believed that the states would continue
somehow as viable governmental entities, but at the same time they would be
united into a new powerful and efficient government.7 One author suggests
five different shades of positions on the federalism spectrum at the Philadel-
phia Convention.8 Federalism here is used to embrace those who, at the one
extreme, thought that confederation under the existing Articles of Confedera-
tion supplied sufficient unity and that a more centralized government would
ultimately swallow the independent states. At the other extreme were those
who were more likely to argue for a national government sufficient to curb the
abuses of the states. But, with few exceptions, even those most inclined to a
more nationalist solution realized that political realities called for the
preservation of the states.
After the Revolutionary War ended, great disillusionment set in as leaders
throughout the states saw the abuses committed by the very state legislatures
they had regarded as protectors against British tyranny. Many of the founding
fathers like Madison, as they came to Philadelphia in 1787, were aware of the
democratic excesses of the state legislatures.9 Some viewed state legislative
assemblies as little more than mob rule. The states had, for instance, passed
laws for the confiscation of property and for the printing of paper money with
the fiat that it was to be accepted by creditors as legal tender. British
creditors, despite the protection afforded them in the Treaty of Peace of 1783,
found state courts an obstacle to effective debt collection. The state legisla-
tures even attempted to gain control of all judicial and executive powers. Thus
these state legislatures, empowered by the constitutions drafted during the heat
6. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 109 (1991).
7. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 65-66 (1988).
8. FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 213-215 (1985). On the wide disparity of views among those loosely labeled anti-
federalists, See Saul Cornell, Moving Beyond the Canon of Traditional Constitutional History:
Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights, and the Promise of Post-Modern Historiography, 12 LAW AND
HIST. REV. 1 (1994).
9. See Peter S. Onuf, James Madison's Extended Republic, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 2375,
2376 (1990).
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of the revolution, had themselves become the source of tyranny.", "The
people, it seemed, were as capable of despotism as any prince.""
Most leaders at the Constitutional Convention, therefore, agreed on some
form of federalism, although disagreements remained sharp on the precise
boundaries between state and federal authority.' 2 In general, some delegates
to the Constitutional Convention, made wise by the need for compromise,
conceived of the national government and the state governments as operating
in different spheres. The states would control the objects of government
within their own boundaries and the national government would have power
on all objects which extended beyond the reach of individual states. The
national government, therefore, would not have full and total legislative
power, but only certain enumerated powers, while the states would retain
sovereignty over other objects. Some framers thought the secret to the success
of this unprecedented form of government was the national government's
power to act directly and coercively on the individual, who remained a citizen
of a state. 1
3
Not surprisingly, therefore, the framers of the Constitution had the
greatest difficulty in agreeing on proper legislative representation in their
federal republic. The crucial and most extended debate during the summer of
1787 centered on the issue of representation in the new national legislature.
Only with the acceptance of the great compromise were the extreme and
discordant views of federalism sufficiently reconciled to complete the
Constitution. Under the great compromise, popular representation would exist
in the lower house of the legislature, while the states would be equally
represented in the upper house. Bills for taxation or spending could originate
only in the lower house. " In effect, federalism was preserved by allowing
the states themselves to take their equally weighted seats in one house of the
national legislature. To assure, however, that the new national government
would not become as ineffective as that under the Articles of Confederation,
the founding fathers determined that the federal Constitution and laws, as well
as treaties, would be the supreme law of the land.'"
Federalism, therefore, became the key to the great compromise that made
possible most of the other compromises in the Constitution. Federalism, as
10. WOOD, supra note 5, at 393-413.
11. Id. at 410.
12. A few delegates to the Philadelphia Convention seem to have thought of the possibility
of abolishing the states. See Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES, 85, 87 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber, ed., 1978); McDONALD, supra
note 8, at 214.
13. Scheiber, supra note 12, at 88.
14. MCDONALD, supra note 8, at 236.
15. See id. at 255-56, 275-76.
[Vol. 46:647
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss5/3
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789
we shall see, is likewise the key for understanding the formation of the
judiciary in the Constitution and especially in the Judiciary Act of 1789. This
federal compromise in forming the judiciary of the new government will be the
main focus of the discussion that follows.
The founding generation derived its diverse understandings of republican-
ism from its wide reading of classical texts and the British and continental
authors who wrote from that point of* view. They derived their firm
convictions on federalism from their experience with the political realities
around them and their innate sense of loyalty to their own state. Additionally,
the common law was another source of influence that helped to shape the
judiciary. Lawyers wrote Article III of the Constitution, the judiciary article,
and they also drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789. Their understanding of the
processes and procedures as well as the substance of the common law, as
practiced in their respective states, constituted a third basis on which they built
the new federal judiciary.
Those who formed the new federal judiciary were men of wide and
diverse learning who could readily quote from the classical texts and from
ancient or modem history.' 6 Although some of these sources are difficult to
trace, they undoubtedly colored the thinking and arguments of the founders. 7
II. FORMATION OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE CONSTITUTION
A historian searches in vain for long and thoughtful debates over the
formation of the third branch of government, the judiciary, during the 1787
Constitutional Convention. When one quickly surveys the debates at the
16. Knud Haakonssen, From Natural Law to the Rights of Man: European Perspective on
American Debates, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS,
AND LAW-1791-1991, 19-61 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen, eds., (1991). For a
discussion of the religious values of the founding generation, see John M. Murrin, Fundamental
Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution, in To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE
CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1 (Herman Belz et al., eds. 1992).
17. There is also the question of an economic explanation of the creation of the federal
judiciary. This issue has been well discussed in an insightful article on the formation of the
federal judiciary by Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L. J. 1421. Holt's thesis focuses on the pro-
creditor, pro-commercial biases implicit in debates and compromises that led to the creation of
the federal judiciary in 1789. Holt also supplies a detailed background of the economic factors
influencing the debates.
It is true that many of the founding fathers opposed state paper money schemes and pro-
debtor legislation. This, it appears, was not to further their own short or long range interests as
creditors. Rather, they opposed these inflationary schemes because, as true republicans, they
were firmly convinced that these schemes undermined the moral fabric of society and corrupted
the common good. See Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the
Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION:ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 103-109 (Richard Beeman et al., eds. 1987).
19951
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Constitutional Convention, one might get the impression that Article III of the
Constitution was practically an afterthought for the delegates. They had
perhaps exhausted their debating energy on the legislative compromises, or
maybe Madison, the principal note taker, failed to include a full summary of
the debates as he did elsewhere in his notes. Gouverneur Morris' recollection
of his role in drafting the final version of Article III, expressed a quarter
century after the event, does not at first appear totally implausible. In 1814
he wrote to a friend informing him that he had served on the Committee on
Style that prepared the final draft of the Constitution. Morris claimed that for
the judiciary article he had deliberately blurred over the various conflicting
opinions with his own careful selection of phrases in order to get Article III
accepted in its final form. 8 Morris's claim, however, vastly overstates his
contribution.
Since the major concern of this Paper is with the Judiciary Act of 1789,
it is unnecessary to trace each step of the evolution of the judiciary during the
debates over the Constitution. 19  Although little remains of the precise
rumblings during the debates, a careful reading reveals the federal fault line
along which an earthquake could occur at any time.
During the decade before the Constitutional Convention, most Americans
had little experience with any courts which had jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries of their own states.' Since some participants in the Philadelphia
18. Letter from GouverneurMorris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in 3 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 419-20 (Max Farrand ed., 1937), Morris wrote:
That instrument [the final draft of the Constitution] was written by the fingers, which
write this letter. Having rejected redundant and equivocal terms, I believed it to be
as clear as our language would permit; excepting, nevertheless, a part of what relates
to the judiciary. On that subject, conflicting opinions had been maintained with so
much professional astuteness, that it became necessary to select phrases, which
expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor shock their self-love, and to
the best of my recollection, this was the only part which passed without cavil.
Morris' earlier comments on the formation of the Constitution in general and on the true intent
of Article III were part of the Senate debate in 1802 on the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801.
Id. at 390-91. His comments, however, shed no light on the actual drafting of Article II.
19. An old and somewhat dated step-by-step analysis of the debates over the judiciary during
the Constitutional Convention can be found in JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801, 204-50 (1971). See also Ralph A. Rossum, The Courts and the Judicial
Power, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 222-41 (Leonard W. Levy
& Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987). Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article 111, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
741 (1984); supra note 18.
20. The Continental Congress had tried to avoid costly, possibly bloody, interstate disputes
over rival land claims by creating an ad hoc body of commissioners for such disputes. They heard
only one case. See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1787 6 (1983). The Continental Congress also
created several successive adjudicative bodies to determine appeals in cases of capture of enemy
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Convention had experience with the appellate prize tribunals set up by the
Continental Congress, they knew first hand that admiralty jurisdiction had
international ramifications. A few had learned that uncontrolled state admiralty
courts hearing prize disputes could give rise to interstate and international
resentment.2
Despite this limited experience with a continental court, the delegates to
the Convention all saw the need for some judicial dimension to the new
government. There apparently was no disagreement on the need to establish
one supreme national court.' For believers in the principle of separation of
powers, the new national government could not be complete without its own
judicial authority to interpret and apply federal law.
Unanimity also prevailed in the Convention in assuring the independence
of the judges to be selected for the Supreme Court and any other federal
court.' Judicial independence was to be assured by two constitutionally
secured techniques. The judges would hold their offices during good behavior
instead of for a term of years or at the pleasure of some political official.
Secondly, the legislature and the executive would not have the power to
influence the judges by decreasing their salaries.24
This conviction that the new federal government must have independent
judges grew out of the experiences with colonial judges, appointed at the
pleasure of the Crown, who remained subject to interference from the colonial
governors.' The drafters of the Constitution also drew on their experience
after the Revolution with the legislative assemblies' meddling in legal disputes
as the colonial governors had before the Revolution. During the 1780s, many
thoughtful leaders became disillusioned with the omnipotent and arbitrary state
legislatures. They came to appreciate the crucial importance of judicial
vessels during the Revolutionary War. See HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL
COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1775-1787
(1977). A significant number of the founding fathers, but not the general population, had
experienced the limited effectiveness of these appellate prize bodies. Id. at 328-29.
21. See generally BOURGUIGNON, supra note 20, at 238-318.
22. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 37.
23. 1 id. at 121.
24. At first the founding fathers sought to guarantee that the judges would receive "a fixed
compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect
the persons actually in office at the time." Id. Eventually the drafters were convinced that the
prohibition of salary increases should be omitted because of the likelihood that the value of
money would fluctuate. The judges could maintain sufficient independence even from a
legislature able to increase their salaries. But Article III of the Constitution does prohibit any
decrease in judicial salaries. 2 id. at 44-45. The final language in the Constitution stated that
"The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 1.
25. See WOOD, supra note 5, 159-61.
1995]
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independence in order to assure true separation of powers.26 Only indepen-
dent judges could assert the power, barely hinted at during the 1780s, of
reviewing the acts of the legislature and challenging them as against common
right and natural equity.27 The founding fathers' insistence on an indepen-
dent judiciary was one of their most lasting and significant contributions to the
federal judiciary.
More controversial than judicial independence was the question of judicial
appointment. At first the choice of judges for the Supreme Court and any
other federal courts was left with the Congress, or the National Legislature as
it was called during the Convention.2" Since James Wilson believed that
intrigue and partisanship would necessarily follow if a large legislative body
made judicial appointments, he suggested appointment by the president. John
Rutledge opposed appointment of judges by the president as mimicking too
closely a monarchy. James Madison wavered between these two positions; he
was fearful of appointment by a large legislative body, but he was unsure of
the wisdom of allowing appointment by the chief executive. He suggested the
appointment by the smaller upper house of the legislature, but then proposed
delaying the decision for a later day.29 The Convention accepted Madison's
suggestion that the Senate should have the power of appointing judges because
it was a smaller, more select body, that could better assess the qualifications
of candidates.3" When the issues were again reopened, Nathaniel Gorham
argued that appointment should be by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate necessary for confirmation. This led at that time to a
strenuous debate on the issue of the proper mode of appointment, with prior
positions repeated. At this point in the Convention, Gorham's position was
rejected.3' Ultimately, after the Convention had settled the most divisive
issue of representation in the two houses of Congress, it had little difficulty
26. As Madison said at the Convention, "If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that
the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the
separation, that they should be independent of each other." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 34.
27. See WOOD, supra note 5, at 453-63.
28. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 21.
29. 1 id. at 119-120.
30. 1 id. 232-33. Madison made some telling points in his argument:
Many of them [members of the legislature] were incompetent Judges of the requisite
qualifications. They were too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate
who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who
had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their
Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential
qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not having these
recommendations but possessed of every necessary accomplishment.
Id.
31. 2 id. at 41-44.
[Vol. 46:647
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accepting Gorham's position. Thus, federal judges would be appointed by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate.32
The Constitution surprisingly does say not a word about these judges'
qualifications. Lay judges were common during the colonial period. At a
time when formal law school education was just beginning and apprenticeship
programs were uneven,33 a statement of qualifications for federal judges
would have appeared unwarranted and impossible to articulate. The founding
fathers, however, apparently thought that by establishing an appropriate
machinery for selection of judges, they would assure qualified judges.34
The most divisive issue before the Convention in its debates over the
judiciary was the creation of lower federal courts because it touched too
closely the sensitive nerve of federalism. The drafters of the Constitution
ultimately found this issue too difficult and merely handed it to the first
Congress.
The debate over lower courts began with the simple proposal that the new
judiciary should include "inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National
Legislature." 35 On June 4, 1787, this proposition was approved,36 but on
the next day, John Rutledge reopened the question. He insisted that state
courts could and should decide all cases at the trial level. Appeal to the
Supreme Court would suffice to assure protection of federal rights and to
assure uniform interpretation of federal law. He also argued creating lower
federal courts would only burden the Constitution with unnecessary obstacles
in its path to adoption by the states.37 James Madison replied that lower
federal courts "dispersed throughout the republic" could give final judgment
in many cases and obviate the need for most appeals. Furthermore, he
argued, appeals to the Supreme Court could not effectively solve the problem
of "improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed [sic]
directions of a dependent Judge."" A remand for a new trial before the
same biased judge and jury would be futile, and a new trial before the
Supreme Court would require the expense of bringing witnesses all the way
to the seat of government. Madison concluded that "An effective Judiciary
establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A
government without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk
of a body without arms or legs to act or move."39
32. 2 id. at 538-39. See also U.S.CONST. art. II, § 2, el. 2.
33. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO
THE 1980s 3-4 (1983).
34. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 80-83.
35. 1 id. at 21.
36. 1 id. at 105.
37. 1 id. at 124.
38. 1 id.
39. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 124.
1995]
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James Wilson quickly took up Madison's argument and insisted that at
least admiralty jurisdiction belonged wholly within federal jurisdiction, since
it concerned cases beyond the jurisdiction of any state. State courts, Wilson
implied, should not be able to meddle with foreign disputes. 4' But Roger
Sherman reminded the Convention of the expense of creating a full array of
lower federal courts.41 When it came to a vote, a bare majority decided to
omit mention of inferior federal courts.42
Wilson and Madison immediately moved to adopt a compromise suggested
by John Dickinson "that the National Legislature be empowered to institute
inferior tribunals."'s Pierce Butler, rightly anticipating the reception this
proposal would receive from opponents of the Constitution, stated, "The
people will not bear such innovations. The States will revolt at such
encroachments. " '  Although the Convention approved the proposal of
Wilson and Madison,45 the issue was vigorously opposed.
After the great compromise on legislative representation, the Convention
reconsidered the Wilson and Madison proposal to empower Congress to create
lower federal courts. Butler again insisted that lower federal courts served no
purpose since state courts could handle federal business.46 Luther Martin
objected that lower federal courts would create jealousy and hostility by
interfering with the state courts.47 Gorham apparently told the members of
the Convention that something akin to lower federal courts already existed
within the states to hear cases of piracies and maritime crimes. State courts,
he claimed, had not objected. "Inferior tribunals are essential," Gorham
insisted, "to render the authority of the Natl. Legislature effectual. " "4
Edmund Randolph reminded the Convention that state courts could not be
trusted to apply and interpret federal law leading to conflicting national and
state policy.49 Gouverneur Morris supported the proposal, and Roger
40. 1 id.
41.1 id. at 125.
42. 1 id.
43. lid.
44. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 125.
45. 1 id.
46. 2 id. at 45.
47. 2 id. at 45-46. On an earlier occasion in the debates, Martin had insisted "that a national
Judiciary extended into the States would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy
inconsistent with its usefulness." 1 id. at 341.
48. 2 id. at 46. Gorham's statement, if correctly reported, seems quite inaccurate. At the
insistence of the Continental Congress, the states had created courts to hear cases of maritime
captures of enemy vessels made during the Revolution. Appeals were allowed to a tribunal
created by the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress, however, did not create any
trial courts that functioned within the States with maritime jurisdiction. See BOURGUIGNON supra
note 20, 41-138.
49. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 46.
[Vol. 46:647
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Sherman likewise reluctantly supported it. Sherman hoped that state courts
would be employed at least to the extent they could be used without impairing
the national interest."0 George Mason concluded the debate by observing that
situations might arise in the future, unforeseeable by the Convention, that
might make lower federal courts utterly essential."' After this debate, the
Convention adopted the Wilson-Madison proposal.
As a result of this debate, Article III of the Constitution in its final form
reads, "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." 2 This debate over the creation of lower federal
courts served merely as a rehearsal for a much fuller debate during the
ratification debates and two years later in the First Congress. None of the
objections disappeared; all the same arguments and more were raised.
Establishing federal trial courts within each state constituted one of the greatest
innovations of the new form of government, but also one of the greatest threats
to the principle of federalism.
Defining the jurisdiction of the federal courts was a process of moving
from the general to the specific. At the outset of the Convention the
jurisdiction of the proposed national judiciary fell under five broadly worded
categories: (1) maritime cases beyond the jurisdiction of any state,53 (2) cases
brought by foreigners or citizens of other states,54 (3) cases for the collection
of national revenue, (4) cases of the impeachment of national officials, and (5)
"questions which may involve the national peace and harmony."55 The final
category could hardly have been stated more openendedly.
When this was first debated, for some reason, the Convention eliminated
the categories of maritime cases and cases brought by foreigners or citizens of
other states.56 Perhaps these two specific categories were viewed as em-
braced in the broad language of "national peace and harmony." Edmund
Randolph told the Convention that it was too difficult to determine the
jurisdictional limits of the national judiciary. He indicated the general
50. 2 id.
51. 2 id. By the end of the Convention, Mason was opposed to the Constitution in general
and to the creation of lower federal courts in particular. He objected, "The judiciary of the
United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the
several States: thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as
unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England, and enabling the rich to oppress
and ruin the poor." 2 id. at 638.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
53. "[A]II piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy." 1 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 22.
54. "[C]ases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may
be interested." 1 id.
55. 1 id.
56. 1 id. at 231-32.
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consensus, as he understood it, that the jurisdiction should embrace the
principle of protecting "the security of foreigners where treaties are in their
favor, and to preserve the harmony of states and that of the citizens there-
of."1' Randolph also thought a committee of detail could work out a
statement. William Paterson proposed the more specific categories, but
omitted mention of federal trial courts as well as the final, global grant of
jurisdiction over cases touching the national peace and harmony. He
mentioned cases of impeachment of federal officials, cases involving
ambassadors, cases of capture of enemy vessels and piracies, cases in which
foreigners have an interest under treaty provisions, and cases involving
national statutes regulating trade or collecting revenue."
But when the Convention addressed the question again, it reverted to two
broad categories of federal jurisdiction: "cases arising under laws passed by
the general Legislature, and to such other questions as involve the National
peace and harmony."59 This general statement of jurisdiction was turned
over to the Committee of Detail.' One has to be cautious when deciphering
the notes of the Committee of Detail because they do not include any of the
debates or arguments for changing the wording of the various drafts. The
Committee reported to the Convention a specific list of areas for federal
jurisdiction that were drawn from all the suggestions that had been made
during the debates and a few that apparently the Committee itself added. The
broad, general language of national peace and harmony had been replaced by
a more precisely drafted list of jurisdictional categories. 6' The Convention
made a few alterations in the jurisdictional statement' and then gave it to the
Committee of Style for a final reworking.
57. 1 id. at 238.
58. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 244.
59. 2 id. at 39, 46.
60. 2 id. at 132-33.
61. 2 id. at 186. The Committee report gave the following boundaries to the jurisdiction.
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases arising under laws
passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of Officers of the
United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies
between two or more States, (except such as shall regalrd Territory or Jurisdiction)
between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,
and between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects.
In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, this jurisdiction shall be original.
In all other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions and
under such regulation as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign any
part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President of the
United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper,
to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.
62. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at 430-32, 437.
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It is possibly this jurisdictional section of which Gouverneur Morris was
thinking in 1814 when he said that, in working on the final draft of the
Constitution, he had blurred over differences and used his own choice of
phrases to express the judicial power in a manner acceptable to the full
Convention.63 The final statement of jurisdiction contains clarity where
Morris and the committee had received ambiguity, and it provides a more
elegant expression than the earlier draft.'
This summary suggests the chief issues concerning the judiciary that the
Convention debated. The publication of the Constitution on September 17,
1787, only set the stage for a broader and fuller discussion of the judiciary
during the ratification debates and in the first Congress during the debates on
the Judiciary Act of 1789.
III. DEBATE OVER THE JUDICIARY DURING RATIFICATION
At Jefferson's inauguration in 1801, he somewhat implausibly proclaimed,
"We are all republicans-we are all federalists." If Jefferson's statement ever
was true, it was in 1787 and 1788 during the extensive debates on the
ratification of the Constitution. The participants often drew their artillery from
the same arsenal. At times many of them employed the rhetoric of federalism
as well as the rhetoric of republicanism.
The labels that were attached to the participants in the debate, federalists
and antifederalists, highlight the importance of federalism. The so-called
antifederalists thought of themselves as the true federalists whose name had
been stolen by their opponents. The opponents of the new Constitution
believed in some form of a federal league similar to the loose union of states
under the Articles of Confederation. The antifederalists understood federalism
to mean that the states, as equal and independent sovereignties, had entered
into a limited compact. But the states remained the primary focal point of
political power. The antifederalists opposed the Constitution largely because
they feared the newly created national government would swallow the
63. See supra text accompanying note 18.
64. The final version of the Constitution reads as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1.
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states.' The antifederalists, however, often undermined their own position
by acknowledging the need for more of a union than that under the Articles
of Confederation. Some effective, national or central government was
necessary, but they insisted that the sovereignty of the states must remain
inviolate. The tasks of government might be divided between a national
government and the state governments, but the states must retain suprema-
cy. 6 The antifederalists, therefore, could with candor claim to be federalists.
The proponents of the Constitution, the federalists, did not regard
themselves as illegitimate children parading under someone else's banner.
Before the drafting of the Constitution, those who had tried to make the feeble
Articles of Confederation more effective were called federal men. Thus, prior
to the Constitution, federal and antifederal had already begun to mean either
a willingness or unwillingness to strengthen the ties under the Articles of
Confederation binding the states into some union.67
During the ratification debates, the federalists agreed with the antifederal-
ists that the powers of government must be divided. Only specified powers,
some federalists claimed, would be entrusted to the new national government
with the remaining powers entrusted to the states. Within the national
government's limited sphere, the federalist viewed it as complete, but they
argued the states could act as independent entities within their particular
spheres.6" James Madison attempted to show the new Constitution remained
faithful to republicanism because the constitution derived its powers from the
people. He conceded that certain features of the new government made it
national, but in most aspects, it was federal. Ultimately he concluded that the
new government was a composition of national and federal features.69 The
federalists usually implied the national government must be the primary
authority.
The antifederalists retorted that sovereignty could not be divided; either
the national or the state governments must be sovereign. Divided sovereignty
made no sense. The federalists' rejoinder, most clearly formulated by James
65. See 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 10.
66. See id. at 32-33. See SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY Or
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 237-43 (1993).
67. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 9.
68. Id. at 32.
69. 1 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, 250-57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
Madison summarized this essay by stating,
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness neither a national nor a
federal Constitution; but a composition of both .... [i]n the sources from which the
ordinary powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly
national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of
them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly national.
Id. at 257.
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Wilson, deftly sidestepped the dilemma posed by the antifederalists. The
supreme power did not rest with either the states or the new national
government. Sovereignty resided in the people.70 Thus, the people could
grant specified, limited power to the national government and give the
remaining powers to the states. 1 Thus the federalists, by cautiously avoiding
the issue of divided sovereignty, could continue to defend their vision of a
federal government with powers divided between the state and national
governments.
While opponents and proponents of the Constitution hurled their barbs at
each others' views of federalism, they also fought over the true meaning of
republicanism. For antifederalists, republics had to be small with a homoge-
neous population. A small republic made up of like-minded individuals with
similar status and values would best assure the liberty of the people, because
opposing factions would not arise and representatives could truly express the
interests of the voters. It was absurd, the antifederalists contended, to expect
similar standards of morals, habits, and laws for the vastly different states
stretching from Georgia to Massachusetts. 2
The federalists' initial reply was that such societal homogeneity did not
exist even within the existing states. For example, even in tiny Rhode Island
distinctions among the citizens existed. In any state, there would always be
divergent interests of the rich and the poor, of creditors and debtors, of those
with land and those with business investments.73
James Madison carried the federalist reply much further. He turned the
traditional republican argument inside out in his essay in Federalist No. 10.
He showed that small republics are dangerous precisely because the majority
can become a faction and damage the interests of minorities. Madison
obviously had before his mind the excesses he had observed in the legislative
majorities of the state governments created after the Revolution. Homogeneity,
so basic to the usual republican vision, became in Madison's argument a
dangerous phantom. Some minority interests could be threatened by the
majority faction precisely to the degree the faction faithfully represented the
views and values of most members of society. The answer, Madison insisted,
lay in an extended republic like that created in the new federal union. By
assuring a greater variety of interests and political views, the new Constitution
guaranteed no faction could easily become a majority able to invade the rights
of minorities. Representatives of the people, the very essence of republican
government in Madison's view, could stand above the various differences and
70. WOOD, supra note 5, at 530.
71. Id. at 530-31. See also 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 34.
72. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 15-23, WOOD, supra note 5, at499-
500. See also, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, Cecelia M. Kenyon, ed. xxxix-xli (Indianapolis, 1966).
73. WOOD, supra note 5, at 502.
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factions of the people who elected them and seek the true common good of
the republic. For Madison, the extended republic became possible because of
the joining together of republicanism and the federal principle.74
When the antifederalists focused their attention on the judicial power, they
saved some of their most vehement objections for aspects of the judicial power
that had hardly merited debate at the Philadelphia Convention. The sacred
right of trial by jury, which had barely been discussed at the Convention,
became a major rallying point for the antifederalists. For them the popular
control of the judicial process at the local level must be fully guaranteed in any
republican government. Juries drawn from the body of the people must have
the power to render general verdicts in civil or criminal cases, and their
factual determinations must not be disturbed by distant judges sitting on
appeal. By sitting on the local juries, fellow citizens could effectively protect
the rights of others against abusive governmental powers. 5 The right of trial
by jury, one antifederalist wrote, "'preserves in the hands of the people, that
share which they ought to have in the administration of justice, and prevents
the encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy citizens."' 76 Another
74. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, supra note 69, at 56-65. A far more adequate and nuanced
discussion of Madison's essay can be found in Peter S. Onuf, James Madison's Extended
Republic, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 2375 (1990). See also BEER, supra note 66, at 255-64.
For the influence of Locke on Madison's Federalist essay No. 10, see Isaac Kramnick, The
Discourse of Politics in 1787: The Constitution and Its Critics on Individualism, Community, and
the State, in To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 16, at 166, 178-83.
75. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1 at 18-19: THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra
note 72, at lxx-lxxiii. Luther Martin's objections were typical:
And in all those cases where the general government has jurisdiction in civil
questions, the proposed constitution not only makes no provision for the trial by jury
in the first instance, but by its appellate jurisdiction absolutely takes away that
inestimable privilege, since it expressly declares the supreme court shall have
appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact. Should therefore, a jury be adopted in
the inferior court, it would only be a needless expense, since on an appeal the
determination of that jury, even on questions of fact, however honest and upright, is
to be of no possible effect-the supreme court is to take up all questions of fact-to
examine the evidence relative thereto-to decide upon them in the same manner as
if they had never been tried by a jury-nor is trial by jury secured in criminal cases;
it is true, that in the first instance, in the inferior court the trial is to be by jury, in
this and in this only, is the difference between criminal and civil cases; but, Sir, the
appellatejurisdiction extends, as I have observed, to cases criminal as well as to civil,
and on the appeal the court is to decide not only on the law but on the fact, if,
therefore, even in criminal cases the general government is not satisfied with the
verdict of the jury, its officer may remove the prosecution to the supreme court, and
there the verdict of the jury is to be of no effect, but the judges of this court are to
decide upon the fact as well as the law, the same as in civil cases.
LUTHER MARTIN, MR. MARTIN'S INFORMATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
MARYLAND (1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 27, 70 (emphasis
omitted.)
7,6. LETTERS OF CENTINEL, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 143, 149
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss5/3
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789
antifederalist referred to juries as "the democratic branch of the judiciary
power .. 77 Thus, the antifederalists saw republican values in the
preservation of jury trials.
The federalists ultimately could not withstand these arguments and
pledged that jury trials and their factual determinations would be fully
protected in a Bill of Rights to be prepared by the first Congress and submitted
to the states for ratification.78 (The complex issues of the drafting of the Bill
of Rights, though clearly intertwined with the Judiciary Act, are beyond the
scope of this Article. Since several of the first eight amendments deal with
judicial processes, there obviously was an interrelationship between the
drafting of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the more or less simultaneous
drafting of the Bill of Rights.)
79
During the ratification debates little mention was made of the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of judicial independence for federal judges.8" The antifeder-
(quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND III 379-80).
Another antifederalist expressed these Republican views:
Mhe jury trial brings with it an open and public discussion of all causes, and
excludes secret and arbitrary proceedings. This, and the democratic branch in the
legislature, as was formerly observed, are the means by which the people are let into
the knowledge of public affairs-are enabled to stand as the guardians of each others
rights, and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those who otherwise might
infringe upon them.
THE FEDERAL FARMER, LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, XV (1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 315, 320.
77. JOHN F. MERCER, ESSAYS BY A FARMER, IV (1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 36, 38 (emphasis omittted).
78. Robert A. Rutland, Framing and Ratifying the First Ten Amendments, in TtIE FRAMING
AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at 305, 306-07. See also, Michael
A. Gillespie, Massachusetts: Creating Consensus, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, 138, 152
(Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989); Jean Yarbrough, New Hampshire
Puritanism and the Moral Foundations of America, in id. at 235, 250-55; Lance Banning,
Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in id. 261, 283-87; Cecil L. Eubanks, New York:
Federalism and the Political Economy of Union, in id. at 300, 325-28.
79. The records we have of contemporary commentary do not connect the drafting of the
Judiciary Act, primarily in the Senate, with the roughly simultaneous drafting of the Bill of
Rights, primarily in the House. The drafters of both houses must have been aware of what was
happening with the other. Maeva Marcus and Natalie Wesler, The Judiciary Act of 1789:
Political Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation? in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIA-
RY-ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 13, 27 (Maeva Marcus ed. 1992). See also Akhil
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L. J. 1131, 1181-99 (1991); GOEBEL,
supra note 19, at 413-508 (treating the Bill of Rights and the Judiciary Act sequentially, without
any clear suggestions of their interrelationship).
80. One antifederalist objected to the constitutional guarantee of no diminution in the salary
of federal judges as "quite a novelty in the affairs of government." THE FEDERAL FARMER,
LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XV (1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 1, at 315, 319. He foresaw times of inflation, when judicial salaries would properly
be increased, followed by times of falling prices, when judicial salaries "with equal reason and
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alist who most profoundly and perceptively commented on the proposed
federal judiciary, who signed himself Brutus, expressed the fear that the judges
were made too independent, not only independent of the people and of the
legislature, but "[mien placed in this situation will generally soon feel
themselves independent of heaven itself.""' Thus, he objected to placing
federal judges beyond all control. Under the Constitution, he sensed the
danger of judicial supremacy even over the legislature. "[T]here is no power
above them that can control their decisions, or correct their errors."82
The Brutus essays had been published in New York and could hardly have
been ignored by Alexander Hamilton who, along with John Jay and James
Madison, was also in New York writing as the federalist Publius. Hamilton
perhaps was replying to Brutus in asserting that the judiciary would "always
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution . ... 11
Hamilton insisted the judiciary could never successfully attack the legislative
or executive branches, and "all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend
itself against their attacks."' Constitutionally secure judicial independence
was therefore appropriate.
The antifederalists objected to the expense of the judicial establishment
from two different points of view. Some saw the judiciary as an excessive
additional cost of the new government. Judicial salaries "must add a very
considerable sum to the expense of government."8I More frequently
antifederalists objected to the expense to litigants from cases argued in distant
federal courts. They feared "the intolerable delay, the enormous expenses and
propriety [should] be decreased . . ." 2 Id.
81. BRUTUS, ESSAYS OF BRUTUS (1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
1,358, 438.
82. 2 id. at 439.
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 69, at 522.
84. Id.
85. CORNELIUS, ESSAY BY CORNELIUS (1787), in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 1, at 139, 144. See also LUTHER MARTIN, supra note 75, at 57. Hamilton replied that the
expense of maintaining all three branches of the new government was far less than the expense
of national defense. See THE FEDERALIST No. 34 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 69, at 212-
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infinite vexation to which the people of this country will be exposed" 6 by
cases brought in federal courts.
The antifederalists repeatedly and forcefully pointed to the dangers of
allowing lower federal courts to sit within the states. George Mason, who
participated in the Constitutional Convention but refused to sign its final
product, objected that the federal judiciary would "absorb and destroy the
Judiciaries of the several States; thereby rendering Law... tedious[,] intricate
and expensive, and Justice. . . unattainable . "..."87 Another antifederalist
found federal courts "a very invidious jurisdiction, implying an improper
distrust of the impartiality and justice of the tribunals of the states."88 A
third antifederalist viewed the Supreme Court as an "imperial jurisdiction, clad
in a dread array, and spreading its wide domain into all parts of the conti-
nent."89 He anticipated that the federal judiciary would "swallow up all
other courts of judicature. "I
The author Brutus, with his usual penetrating analysis, predicted that:
86. SAMUEL BRYAN, THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE
CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 146, 160. Another critic observed:
The tradesman, mechanic, and farmer, would by this [judicial] establishment, be
exposed to every imposition from the wealthy; as the former could not spare the time,
and defray the expense of prosecuting their legal claims, distant from home. This
mode also gives every advantage to British and other foreign creditors to embarrass
the American merchant by appeals to this Court.
CANDIDUS, ESSAYS BY CANDIDUS 1 (1787), in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
1, at 125, 129.
87. GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE
CONVENTION (1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 11, 12.
88. LETTERS OF CENTINEL, supra note 76, at 148. Centinel also observed,
The objects of [federal] jurisdiction recited above, are so numerous, and the shades
of distinction between civil causes are oftentimes so slight, that it is more than
probable that the state judicatories would be wholly superseded; for in contests about
jurisdiction, the federal court, as the most powerful, would ever prevail.
2 id. at 140.
89. THE IMPARTIAL EXAMINER, ESSAYS BY THE IMPARTIAL EXAMINER (1788), in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 173, 182.
90. 5 id. The dissenting delegates to the Pennsylvania Convention who supported this view
stated that:
The judicial powers vested in Congress are also so various and extensive, that
by legal ingenuity they may be extended to every case, and thus absorb the state
judiciaries, and when we consider the decisive influence that a general judiciary
would have over the civil polity of the several states, we do not hesitate to pronounce
that this power, unaided by the legislative, would effect a consolidation of the states
under one government.
SAMUEL BRYAN, supra note 86, at 156-57.
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One inferior court must be established, I presume, in each state, at
least, with the necessary executive officers appendant thereto. It is easy
to see, that in the common course of things, these courts will eclipse the
dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the state courts. These
courts will be, in themselves, totally independent of the states, deriving
their authority from the United States, and receiving from them fixed
salaries; and in the course of human events it is to be expected, that they
will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the respective states.
91
Brutus also most forcefully expressed the antifederalist apprehension that
federal courts, with their equitable power, would interpret the already
ambiguous text of the Constitution according to its spirit and purpose as stated
in the preamble. These courts, he feared, would determine the validity of
state laws and destroy states' rights. The states would thereby become utterly
insignificant and not worth continuing.'
Brutus insisted nothing was wrong with state courts. "State courts
always administer[ed] justice with promptitude and impartiality according to
the laws of the land."' Although Brutus admitted some states had created
paper money and authorized debtors to discharge their debts with the
depreciated currency, he insisted these evils were not caused by any flaw in
the state courts. Brutus, however, argued the state courts had generally given
a narrow interpretation to these legal tender laws.94 State courts, therefore,
should be trusted to bring justice to every person's door and to decide fairly
all civil cases, even those involving citizens from other states or foreign
nations.'
Brutus clearly expressed the underlying fear of the antifederalists, that the
new government was "calculated to abolish entirely the state governments, and
to melt down the states into one entire government ... "96 Furthermore,
Brutus believed the new federal judiciary would be the chief instrument of the
states' destruction. "Nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the
abolition of the state governments than the constitution of the judicial. "I
Despite the cogent objections of Brutus and other antifederalists, the state
conventions ultimately ratified the Constitution. We often forget today how
plausible the argument was for using state courts as the only trial courts, with
only appeals to a Supreme Court to assure uniform application of federal law.
91. BRUTUS, supra note 81, at 366-67.
92. 2 id. at 420-28.
93.2 id. at 435.
94. 2 id. at 435-46.
95. 2 id. at 436-37.
96. BRUTUS, supra note 81, at 441.
97. 2 id.
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Lower federal courts were, in the eyes of many, problematical, and a nation
could have been created without them.
When the president was selected and Congress was elected, it became
apparent that the Constitution itself provided for the creation of the executive
and legislative powers, with the full scope of authority vested in these two
branches by Articles I and II of the Constitution. The judiciary, however,
could not be born without the congressional midwife. Without action by
Congress, the judicial power would remain mere empty words in Article IH.
The cogent and politically popular arguments of many antifederalists could
hardly be forgotten as the Senate considered the drafting of the Judiciary Act.
IV. THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789
Previous studies of the Judiciary Act of 1789 have provided valuable,
original insights from a limited range of documents.98 Thanks to the splendid
editorial work of Maeva Marcus and her staff, we now have access to a vastly
broader array of documents, correspondence, and newspaper articles on the
debates over the drafting of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 99 This treasure trove of
information will provide whatever meat there is in what follows.
On Tuesday, April 7, 1789, the day after the first Senate had a quorum
to organize itself, it "ORDERED, That Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Paterson, Mr.
Maclay, Mr. Strong, Mr. Lee, Mr. Basset, Mr. Few, and Mr. Wingate
comprise a Committee, to bring in a bill for organizing the JUDICIARY of the
United States."" ° One senator was appointed from each of the ten states that
had at that time ratified the Constitution."0' Oliver Ellsworth, William
Paterson, and Caleb Strong provided the leadership on the committee,
presumably because of their extensive legal experience. These three, plus
Richard Bassett and William Few, had participated in the debates at the
Philadelphia Convention." Ellsworth soon stood out as the leading archi-
tect of the judiciary. 3 By the end of May a subcommittee, consisting of
98. See, e.g., WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wythe Holt & L.H.
LaRue eds., (1990); William R. Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of its Authority over
the Federal Courts' Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101 (1985); Holt, supra note 17; Charles
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49
(1923).
99. 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-
1800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: LEGISLATION AND COMMENTARIES, (Maeva
Marcus, et al eds., (1992) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
100. SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1791, 11 (1972). On April 13, Mr. Carroll and
Mr. Izard were added to the committee. 1 id. at 14.
101. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 22.
102. 4 id. at 22 n.5.
103. A committee member wrote, "Ellsworth seems to be the leading projector, who is a very
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Ellsworth, Paterson and Strong and perhaps others had formulated a fairly
detailed draft of the proposed legislation. However, debate in the full
committee and in the Senate was delayed by the press of other business until
June 12, 1789.' 04 Unfortunately, the Senate journal gives little insight into
these debates.
When the draft bill was printed, many members of both houses of
Congress sent copies or summaries to friends, mostly lawyers, for comments.
The dozens of letters received in reply, like a modem committee hearing,
raised numerous objections to and questions about many aspects of the bill.
This correspondence, together with the various drafts of each section of the
bill and some other forms of commentary, provide the illuminating material
assembled by Maeva Marcus and her staff.
A. The Anatomy of the Judiciary Act
The basic skeletal outline of the final Act remained the same from the
initial draft. An early sketch shows the committee from the beginning sought
to create a stripped-down federal judicial system that was politically acceptable
rather than one enjoying the full scope of power contained in Article III. The
antifederalists harsh criticism still rang clearly in the committee's ears.
Federalism would remain the basic underlying explanation of the most
important aspects of the Senate bill. Article III provided a ceiling rather than
a floor. It reminded the committee of the outer limits of judicial power but
did not, in their minds, compel them to grant the judiciary all the authority
potentially contained in the constitutional judicial power. 5
Before the bill came before the full committee, Ellsworth wrote to a
fellow member of the Connecticut bar and described the basic elements that,
sensible man & will do very well if he is not too much attached to the forms of law he has long
been [in] the habits of." Letter from Paine Wingate to Timothy Pickering (April 29, 1789), in
4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 382. Another committee member took a more
negative view of Ellsworth's leading role. He wrote "[T]his Vile Bill is a child of [Ellsworth's],
and he defends it with the Care of a parent. [Ev]en with wrath and anger. lH]e kindled as he
always does When it was meddled with . . . ." William Maclay Diary Entry (June 29, 1789),
in id. at 427.
104. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 23.
105. This important conclusion will emerge from the discussion below. See also, Marcus &
Wexler, supra note 79, at 13-16.
Akhil Amar has provided appealing and logically coherent arguments concerning the
relationship between the precise language of Article III and the various key sections of the
Judiciary Act. Akhil R. Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990). From my reading of the contemporary sources, however, I have the
impression that the participants in the debate over the Judiciary Act were far more concerned with
finding an acceptable compromise to the tensions of federalism than with implementing the exact
language of Article III.
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with some modifications, would ultimately be in the Judiciary Act.10 6
Ellsworth wrote that the bill allowed for one Supreme Court with six
members. The Court would hold two sessions each year near the seat of
government. The bill also allowed for a federal district court with one judge
in each state. The district court's jurisdiction included admiralty cases, lesser
criminal offenses, and a few other types of cases to be discussed below. The
judiciary would also sit in circuit courts that would hear cases in the three
circuits into which the country would be divided. This circuit court, the most
original creation of the committee, in part expressed the unwillingness of the
committee even to propose a strong district court with broad jurisdiction in
each state. The Circuit Court would consist of two Supreme Court judges,
literally riding the circuit, and the district judge of the district where they were
sitting. This circuit court would have some appellate jurisdiction over the
district courts, making it a traveling miniature Supreme Court. The circuit
court would also have original jurisdiction over all federal crimes, over cases
between foreign parties and citizens, or between citizens of different states.
Thus the circuit court, with greater prestige than the district courts, would
bring the federal judicial power into all of the states. The Senate plan
included a $500 jurisdictional minimum for the circuit court's diversity
jurisdiction, thus leaving most cases in state courts."° Appeals from the
circuit courts to the Supreme Court could be granted on legal issues only, with
a jurisdictional amount of at least $2000. The Circuit Court would thus be
effectively a traveling mini-Supreme Court, the court of last resort for most
cases within its jurisdiction.
The three-tiered structure of Supreme Court, circuit courts and district
courts remained intact throughout the debates of the coming months.
Before the House debate over the Judiciary Act was completed, Ellsworth,
its principal architect, expressed in another letter his rationale for adopting
various compromises in the bill. Because of Ellsworth's influence on the
drafting of the bill, his letter merits a lengthy quotation. Ellsworth wrote:
To annex to State Courts jurisdictions which they had not before, as of
admiralty cases, & perhaps of offenses against the United States, would be
constituting the Judges of them, protanto [to that extent], federal Judges,
& of course they would continue such during good behavior & on fixed
saleries, which in many cases, would illy comport with their present
tenures of office. Besides if the State Courts as such could take cogni-
zance of those offenses, it might not be safe for the generall government
to put the trial & punishment of them entirely out of its own hands. One
federal Judge at least, resident in each State, appears unavoidable. And
106. Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law, April 30, 1789, DOCUMENTARY HIsToRY,
supra 100, at 382.
107. See Holt, supra note 17, at 1488 n.234.
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without creating any more, or much enhancing the expense, there may be
circuit courts, which would give system to the department, uniformity to
the proceedings, settle many cases in the States that would otherwise go to
the Supreme Court, & provide for the higher grade of offenses. Without
this arrangement there must be many appeals or writs of error from the
supreme courts of the States, which by placing them in a Subordinate
scituation [sic], & Subjecting their decissions to frequent reversals, would
probably more hurt their feelings & their influence, than to divide the
ground with them at first & leave it optional with the parties entitled to
federal Jurisdiction, where the causes are of considerable magnitude to
take their remedy in which line of courts they pleased.'0 8
In this letter, Ellsworth explained that state courts should not sit as federal
trial courts because the state courts lack the judicial independence required by
Article III, have not had experience trying admiralty cases, and should not be
entrusted with the exclusive power of trying federal criminal cases. Thus, he
concluded with apparent reluctance that one federal judge must sit in each state
to constitute the federal district court. He viewed circuit courts as the final
federal court for most cases within federal jurisdiction. The circuit courts
allowed "litigants to have certain types of cases tried in a federal court without
the possibility of an appeal to the distant Supreme Court. Ellsworth believed
too many appeals to the Supreme Court from state courts would be undesirable
and offensive to state sensitivities.
The message of federalism, the need to maintain the proper federal
balance between state and federal courts, echoes throughout Ellsworth's second
letter to Law. Neither letter mentions a word about the Article III grant of
federal judicial power over "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority. . . . "9 What happened to this important
federal question jurisdiction will be one of the principal issues discussed
below.
B. The Physiology of the Federal Judiciary
The drafters of the Judiciary Act knew they had to breathe life into the
bare bones of the new judiciary; they had to spell out the processes and
procedures, the powers and remedies, and the personnel and sessions. It
should be obvious that here, more than on any other issue, the lawyers on the
committee would supply the leadership for the Senate as it tried to make the
federal judiciary a functioning entity. On these issues the lawyers gained little
108. Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law (August 4, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HisToRY, supra note 99, at 495.
109. U.S.CoNST. art. I, § 2 cl. 1.
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guidance from the rhetoric of republicanism and they obviously felt con-
strained on many issues by the different states' judicial practices. Thus,
federalism played a key role. But here the intellectual frame of reference for
the lawyers on the committee was often the common law as they had come to
know it and practice it. By common law, I mean primarily the procedural
rules that enabled the courts to receive and hear the cases that came before
them.
One member of the committee, William Maclay, recorded in his diary
how the lawyers dominated the committee. The judiciary bill, Maclay wrote,
"was fabricated by a knot of Lawyers who Join hue and cry to run down any
Person, who will venture to say one Word about it."" 0 A newspaper article
written after the Act's completion was also critical of the lawyers' role in
drafting the Act. "The adoption of this Judiciary system, therefore, plainly
proves, that the present Members have fully provided for their own profession;
and established an inexhaustible source of business for themselves, and
posterity."1"
A moderate antifederalist on the committee, Richard Henry Lee, perhaps
was more willing to accept the basic terms of the bill after receiving a letter
from a judge friend who generally supported the draft bill. The judge found
the bill "as little exceptionable as possible" and concluded that a system of
procedural rules for the federal courts was appropriate.1
2
With the leadership of the lawyers on the committee, the drafters wrote
into the bill the dates and places for the circuit courts to hold their ses-
sions."' Some towns hoping to benefit by being selected as the place where
110. William Maclay Diary Entry (July 2, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
99, at 439. Two days later he added, "The Gentlemen of the bar are so numerous in ... our
house that Wh[en they] unite, they are irresistible[.]" Letter from William Maclay (July 4, 1789),
in id., at 449. A few days later, however, he was mollified when some prominent lawyers
expressed their approval of the bill. "I own The approbation of so many Men of Character for
abilities has lessened my dislike of it .... William Maclay Diary Entry (July 7-8, 1789), in
id., at 454.
111. INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, (Sept. 16, 1790), in 4 DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 538.
112. Letter from Richard Parker to Richard Henry Lee (July 6, 1789) in id., at 452. Parker
concluded the letter with the observation, "Perhaps upon comparing the Laws of the several
States respecting the practice of the Courts a judicious System of Rules may be selected and I
really think Rules are necessary and ought to be in the Law establishing each Court." 4 id. at
453.
On Lee's earlier role as an anti-federalist, see Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor
Edmund Randolph, (Oct. 16, 1787), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 112-
18. Lee, during the period when the Judiciary Act was being debated, wrote to Patrick Henry
generally approving the terms of the bill. Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Oliver Wolcott, Sr.
(May 30, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 399-400, n.1.
113. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 5, in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 46 (originally
enacted at 1 Stat. 73, 75).
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a circuit court would sit lobbied for selection." 4 Small, practical details did
not escape the committee's notice. It established the rules for adjourning the
Supreme Court or the circuit courts when the courts lacked a quorum of
judges." 5 The committee also provided the essential personnel, clerks,' and
marshals for the new courts. 116  The final Act responded to strong local
demands by determining that the future states of Maine and Kentucky would
have special arrangements for their circuit courts. I"
Of course, the most important decisions concerning the federal judiciary
involved the jurisdictional boundaries of the Supreme Court, the circuit courts,
and the district courts. This will be discussed more fully below. Precise rules
and a jurisdictional amount in controversy were stated for the removal of a
diversity case from a state court to a circuit court.'
The common-law experience of the lawyers on the committee is apparent
in the grant to federal courts of the power to issue all writs that were
"necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to
the principles and usages of law."" 9 The bill included an essential element
for discovery by allowing federal courts to require the parties to produce
books or records for trial. 20 But the committee departed from the tradition-
al British practice of using depositions and interrogatories in admiralty and
chancery courts by requiring the witnesses to testify orally in open court.'
The committee also altered traditional admiralty and equity practice by
requiring that the facts of the case be stated as part of the record.
22
Because admiralty and equity cases were strange to the practice of many
common-law lawyers throughout the country, the Judiciary Act allowed these
cases within the federal jurisdiction only after they took on some of the
familiar appearances of common law cases.
The committee had to overcome considerable opposition to assure that
federal circuit courts could sit as courts of chancery, a jurisdiction unknown
in many of the states. Ultimately the bill merely stated that federal courts
114. Letter from George Phillips to Benjamin Huntington, Jonathan Sturges, and Jonathan
Trumbull (July 25, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 477-79. See also id.
at 46.
115. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 6, supra note 113, at 48.
116. Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 7, 27, supra note 113, at 50, 88.
117. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 10, supra note 113, at 57-58.
118. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 12, supra note 113, at 63-64.
119. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, supra note 113, at 71. The committee insisted, however, that
habeas corpus would not be available in federal courts for prisoners in state custody, an obvious
bow to the political realities of federalism. 4 id.
120. Judicaiary Act of 1789 § 15, supra note 113, at 72.
121. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 30, supra note 113, at 95-96. Where a witness might be
unavailable to give testimony at trial, the committee provided for depositions, after notice to the
adverse party who would have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 4 id.
122. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 19, supra note 113, at 76.
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could not hear "suits in equity . . . in any case where plain, adequate and
complete remedy may be had at law. " " In his diary, William Maclay
recorded the hostility toward chancery. In the debate on this section, he
assured the Senate that most Americans abhorred equity jurisdiction. He
suggested that chancery existed to purchase delay and to make the outcome of
trials turn on the depth of the parties' purses. 124  Equity jurisdiction,
therefore, was tolerated in the Judiciary Act, but only as a last resort when a
common-law suit could not provide a remedy.
The lawyers on the committee showed their awareness of common-law
practice throughout the Act. Careful of small details as well as large, they
wrote into the bill the power for federal courts to grant new trials, to
administer oaths, to punish for contempt, and to establish "all necessary rules
for the orderly conducting [of] business ... ."15 The circuit courts were
empowered to grant stays of judgment for forty-two days to allow the party to
petition for a new trial. 
1 26
The committee also prescribed the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy
minimums for different types of cases, and it specified the penalty for a
plaintiff who won a judgment that was less than the required amount. 121 The
Act determined that, except for extraordinary cases, the circuit court would be
the final appeal within the federal system. To appeal a case to the Supreme
Court, one had to meet the large jurisdictional amount of $2000.128 The
committee also sought to limit review by either the circuit court or the
Supreme Court only to serious legal issues. The Act forbade the use of a writ
of error for technical failures (pleas in abatement except to jurisdiction) or for
errors of fact. 29 The Act, borrowing from an English statute, made the
survival of a suit possible after the death of a party. 30
123. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 16, supra note 113, at 73.
124. Comparing equity with the common law courts, where juries determined the facts, Maclay
concluded that "every thing after the Verdict of a Jury was a mere Trap to catch fees." William
Maclay Diary Entry (July 13, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 99, at 463.
When equity was discussed, it appears that William Paterson spoke against equity jurisdiction.
His notes are quite elliptical and difficult to interpret. William Paterson's Notes on Judiciary Bill
Debate in id., at 429-30 (June 29-30, 1789), and William Maclay Diary Entry (June 29, 1789),
in id. at 427-28.
125. Section 17, id. 74-75.
126. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 18, supra note 113, at 75-76.
127. Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 20-22. supra note 113, at 77-80.
128. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 22, supra note 113, at 79-80.
129. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 80. The final Act also provided federal
courts could hear the merits of a case despite technically defective pleadings. The parties were
allowed to amend the pleadings. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 32, supra note 113, at 100-01.
130. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 31, supra note 113, at 99.
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Bail in criminal cases became a controversial issue. The Act, after some
debate, allowed state and federal judges to issue arrest warrants and to grant
bail in non-capital cases. 1
3
One of the most controversial issues confronting the drafters of the
Judiciary Act was the method for selecting juries in criminal cases. In the
final version of the Act, jurors for capital cases in federal courts had to be
selected from the county where the crime had been committed. The jurors
would be selected either by lot or according to the selection process used by
the state where the trial was held.' 32 In response to the outcry during the
ratification debates, the Senate committee assured critics that common-law civil
trials would be by jury, and the federal circuit courts or the Supreme Court
would review on appeal only the legal issues of the case,' 33
The same committee that drafted the Judiciary Act also wrote the Process
Act of 1789, a companion bill that was enacted five days after the Judiciary
Act. The original plan appears to have been to create a set of uniform rules
for bringing suits in federal court. For any judge or lawyer with extensive
legal practice, the effort of the committee to spell out some rules of practice
for initiating a law suit must have seemed essential. But common law practice
rules varied greatly among the states, and ultimately the hope of uniform rules
proved unrealistic. It took Congress nearly a century and a half before it
established uniform federal rules of civil procedure. 34 The first Congress,
influenced by the procedural differences among the states and the apparent fear
of unfamiliar procedures in the new federal courts, finally determined that
state rules of process and procedure would have to be followed in any federal
court sitting as a court of common law in that state. Process in admiralty and
chancery suits would be "according to the course of the civil law," whatever
that might have been intended to mean to common-law lawyers of the day."'
At least it meant there would be no jury trials. This procedural balkanization,
131. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 33, supra note 113, at 102-03.
132. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 29, supra note 113, at 91-92.
133. JudiciaryAct of 1789 §§ 9,12,22,25, supra note 113, at 53-54, 63-64, 69, 79-80, 85-86.
134. The history of the establishment of uniform federal rules of civil procedure is briefly
sketched in CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 423-28 (5th ed. 1994).
135. The Process Act of 1789, in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 108-21
(originally enacted at I Stat. 93). The Process Act of 1789 and its 1792 amendments have been
most fully discussed in GOEBEL, supra note 19, at 509-551.
The lawyers of America in the 1780s had precious little idea how admiralty courts
functioned in England and undoubtedly even less understanding of admiralty practice on the
Continent. English admiralty reports were not published until the late 1790s, and therefore,
American lawyers had few means of grasping "the course of the civil law." One prominent
lawyer of the day, who had served as an admiralty judge during the Revolutionary War and
would soon be appointed as a federal district judge, Francis Hopkinson, pointed out in 1785 that
American lawyers did not even know the difference between prize and instance practice in
English admiralty courts. Dean et al. v. John Angus, Bee Reports, 369, 372 (1785).
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created by the first Congress, continued in modified forms until 1938.
Perhaps this utter abdication of the effort to establish fully an autonomous
federal court system with uniform rules of process represented federalism
triumphant, or the failure perhaps merely highlighted the fear of many lawyers
that they might have to learn a new system of procedure.
Congress also failed to adopt or incorporate a uniform body of common
law as the substantive law to be applied in federal court. There apparently
was little support for adopting English common law as the federal substantive
rule to be applied. One judge, however, stood out as the singular voice for
making the English common law and statutes the rules of decision in federal
courts. 1 6  Far more typical was the objection of a lawyer who found it
demeaning for the United States to adopt English common law. One opponent
to the adoption of the English common law said that "the dignity of America
requires that [the common law] be ascertained, and that where we refer to laws
they should be laws of our own country."" 7 Since it was meaningless at the
time to talk of the common law of the United States, the committee determined
that "the laws of the several States except where the Constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the
United States in cases where they apply."' s Thus, the new federal courts
would have to look to state courts for the substantive and procedural law to be
applied unless a federal statute enacted some clear rule.
Americans in all states, from Connecticut to Georgia, generally spoke
English. But the dialects and idioms changed from state to state and from
136. Letter from Edward Shippen to Robert Morris (July 13, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 464-67. Although no other lawyers agreed, Judge Shippen's words
are worth quoting:
It is of the utmost Consequencethat the Judiciary Law should establish in express
terms by what Law we are to be governed--There are some loose Expressions in the
Bill concerning the Common Law, but it is no where said the Judges should decide
according to it--The American States have generally adopted it, either in their
Constitutions or by Act of Assembly. The United States should likewise adopt it; and
it should not be left to the Judges to make the Law, but only to declare it--Perhaps
the Common Law alone would not be sufficient--there are many Statutes made in
England before our Revolution which amend and improve the Common Law; some
of these have been long practiced under in America, and are incorporated with the
Common Law, which would be imperfect without them--I own it is a difficult and
delicate Point to fix by any Rule the Extension of the Statutes; and perhaps here there
may be a necessity to leave some latitude to the Judges--Such Statutes as do not suit
our Circumstances, or which have never been at all admitted here, should certainly
not be introduced[.]
4 id. at 466-67.
137. Letter from Gunning Bedford, Jr. to George Read (June 24, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 418.
138. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34, supra note 113, at 105.
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region to region. Similarly the common law, procedural and substantive, had
evolved differently in each state. Some of the court systems in the original
states had been functioning for more than a century and a half before Congress
drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789. It is not surprising that Congress ultimately
instructed federal courts to borrow the familiar substantive and procedural law
of the different states. The members of the committee, as well as most of the
members of Congress, must have shared an uneasiness about the federal
judicial system they were creating and inserting into the states. The compro-
mise the Senate committee came up with effectively meant that all practitioners
should speak in court in the dialect and idiom of that state. There seems to
have been little fight over the quickly aborted attempt to formulate in a statute
new uniform federal rules of judicial process. Throughout the Act great
sensitivity for the diversity of the states marked the work of Congress.
C. Cost of the Federal Courts
Many who discussed, debated, and opposed the creation of federal district
courts argued about their excessive and unnecessary cost. Although many
avenues led individuals to this conclusion, anyone reviewing the statements can
often detect the rhetoric of republicanism.' 39 Opponents of the judiciary bill
frequently raised the cry of luxurious salaries. One member of the House of
Representatives challenged the excessive salaries the Senate had allowed for
the vice president, for the Senate and especially for the federal judges. The
American people, he warned, would not submit to taxation "for the purpose
of feasting a few favorites in luxury and profusion."1 40 A writer in a
newspaper most clearly incorporated republican rhetoric in his vehement
criticism of the Judiciary Act. In opposing the excessive salaries of federal
judges, he wrote:
But the most dangerous principles of these liberal advocates, are that
the money is given to support the splendor of the offices, and to buy the
139. At times one can note the language of republicanism in the writings of those who favored
an effective federal judiciary. In a newspaper article favorable to the establishment of a federal
judiciary, the author, Americanus, adopts some of the platitudes of republican writers,
Private virtue, and the public happiness, are inseparably connected; and while the
comprehensive eye of the statesman takes a view of the happy effect of this principle,
his able hand will be extended by all possible means to preserve the morals of the
community, in giving every encouragement to virtue, industry, and good conduct, on
the one hand, and by the rigid punishment of vice, in all its haggard forms, on the
other.
AMERICANUS, A SKETCH OF THE POLITICAL STATE OF AMERICA, (June 10, 1789), in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 402-03.
140. Letter from Benjamin Goodhue to Samuel Phillips, Jr. (Sept. 13, 1789), in 4 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 508.
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men in office, into integrity. Where the magistrates possess a splendor far
above their fellow citizens, it may, and no doubt will, have a tendency to
awe the people into slavery; but where they can pity the people from
feelings they possess in common with them, there is less danger of tyranny
and oppression. When the judges are raised far above the level of the rest
of the community, they become quite unfit to judge among the people. 141
People already were complaining that the salary proposed for federal
judges was greater than the income that all but the wealthiest few earned from
their estates in this country.'
A member of the Senate committee who drafted the bill, William Maclay,
committed his personal views to his diary,
I opposed this bill from the beginning. It certainly is a Vile law System,
calculated for Expense. and with a design to draw by degrees all law
business into the federal Courts. The Constitution is meant to swallow up
all the State Constitutions by degrees and this to Swallow by degrees all
the State Judiciaries. 43
One observer pointed out that the judiciary would "cost more than it [was]
worth[,J" since at the cost of $50,000 to $60,000 a year the judiciary would
only have jurisdiction to hear "a tenth part of the causes which might by the
constitution come into the federal court."'" It was particularly galling to
grant such high salaries to federal judges who would have "next to nothing"
to do."'45 Another critic insisted this money could be saved "by throwing the
business into the hands of the State Courts . . 146 For a nation already
141. CINCINNATUS, published in HERALD OF FREEDOM, (Oct. 2, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HIsTORY, supra note 99, at 522.
142. Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Oct. 11, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 523.
143. William Maclay Diary Entry (July 17, 1789) in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
99, at 473.
144. Letter from Paine Wingate to Nathaniel P. Sargeant (July 18, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 474. Wingate added, "The Gentlemen of the law in the Senate are
mostly in favor of the bill & when it passed six only voted against it. Mr. Elsworth is the father
of it & Mr. Strong nursed it." 4 id.
145. A FREEMAN, published in CONNECTICUT COURANT, March 22, 1790 in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 530.
146. Letter from Benjamin Goodhue to Cotton Tufts (July 20, 1789), in 4 Documentary
History, supra note 99, at 475. James Madison, then a leader in the House of Representatives,
had difficulty accepting the Senate bill. "[Ilt seems scarcely practicable to carry federal justice
home to the people on this plan without a number of offices & a degree of expense which are
very serious objections to it." Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (July 31, 1789),
in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 491.
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deeply in debt, the added expense of the federal judiciary seemed to some a
strong argument for rejecting it. 1
47
No doubt some form of federal judiciary was necessary "to organize the
government." 14  Many, however, agreed with "Rusticus" who found the
"whole judicial system . . . a giddy profusion, and quite unnecessary."' 49
Many therefore concluded that all the business of the federal courts could have
been performed by state courts with appeals to a Supreme Court to correct
errors.
D. The Federal Compromise
Other reasons besides the cost of the new federal judiciary led many to
oppose or at least to hesitate in endorsing the judiciary bill. From a careful
reading of the numerous letters, newspaper articles, and other contemporary
commentary, I believe the debate in general did not pit nationalists against
states' rights antifederalists. Rather these writings reveal a broad spectrum of
federalists, most of them appreciating the need for a new effective national
government with an appropriate judicial system, but all of them more or less
apprehensive about introducing the federal judicial power into the states.
Possibly there were some nationalists trimming their sails to the wind, but
there is little in the preserved record to prove this.
The major debate over the judiciary centered on the need for and the
powers of the federal district courts. The arguments reiterated the points made
during the Philadelphia Convention and during the ratification process. The
familiar arguments came back with a different intensity but with the same
essential message: The state courts, widely different from each other but
familiar to all the participants in the debate, could hear the federal cases as
well as federal courts and at less expense. As a result, most participants
agreed that the Constitution did not require the creation of lower federal
courts, but merely gave Congress the power to create them. The hot potato
of whether to create lower federal courts had been consciously passed to the
first Congress, and none of the heat had gone out of it in the intervening two
years.
It appears that the first Congress spontaneously gravitated toward a major
consensus, comparable in its constitutional importance to the great compromise
of the Philadelphia Convention concerning representation in the two houses of
Congress. The judicial compromise in the Judiciary Act was that federal
147. See Letter from John Sullivan to John Langdon (Aug. 18, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 500.
148. Letter from Elbridge Gerry to John Wendell (July 4, 1790), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 535.
149. Rusticus, (August 26, 1790, published in INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE), in 4 DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 536.
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district courts would be created, but only for a few, relatively noncontroversial
areas of jurisdiction. These limitations severely restricted the federal district
courts' jurisdiction to areas where the state courts had never had jurisdiction
or could not appropriately take jurisdiction. State courts, on the other hand,
would have jurisdiction over many areas of potential federal jurisdiction,
including most cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws and treaties.
The Supreme Court would travel, in the form of circuit courts, into the states
to bring federal justice close to the people. And the Supreme Court would
assure some measure of uniformity of decisions by reviewing erroneous
decisions of the state courts when they had denied the federal rights asserted.
All of this will be more fully developed, with greater accuracy of detail, in
what follows.
It is important to note at the outset, however, that no one at the time
spoke of such a compromise. Because the extreme positions were seldom
taken, it was easy for the members of the Senate committee to veer toward a
consensus position that was politically acceptable to most members of
Congress and to most of the lawyers, judges, and other commentators who had
reflected on the new judiciary.
1. The State Courts
The Senate committee apparently expected Richard Henry Lee to be the
most difficult member to satisfy. He had been a moderate antifederalist during
the ratification debates. 50 As the committee was finishing its draft of the
judiciary bill, however, Ellsworth felt quite comfortable working with Lee.
In writing to a colleague from Connecticut, he said that
"Our affairs, I think, are going favorably, tho', as might be expected,
slowly. I am satisfied with the Senate. ... We have no schism, nor much
locality. Mr. Lee as yet goes with us." 51
Lee, for his part, seemed equally at ease working with the rest of the
committee. He wrote to Patrick Henry, also an antifederalist, that "[s]o far
as this has gone, I am satisfied to see a spirit prevailing that promises to send
this system out free from those vexations and abuses that might have been
warranted by the terms of the constitution."'
150. 5 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at 111.
151. Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Oliver Wolcott, Sr. (May 30, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 399. I presume that by "locality" Ellsworth meant what a generation
later would call states' rights.
152. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (n.d.), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 99, at 400 n.1 (quoting 2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 487 (James C.
Ballagh ed., On Capo Press 1970) (1911-1914). Lee also wrote to Samuel Adams to inform him
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Lee believed the Senate committee had little desire to give the new federal
judiciary all of Article III's power. He was not diametrically opposed to the
plan outlined in the draft bill. Lee proposed limiting the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts to admiralty and maritime cases." 3 Thus, the federal
judicial power could not intrude into the states except in the one area of
admiralty jurisdiction. Lee argued state judges, bound by their oath to uphold
the Constitution, could administer all the other areas of federal jurisdic-
tion. " Lee's proposal to limit the lower federal courts to admiralty
jurisdiction was the strongest antifederalist position presented in the Senate
debates. Although Lee's position on the merits of the circuit court is unclear,
he went along with a federal district court that had a few other restricted areas
of jurisdiction.
In the House of Representatives, a small group of congressmen wanted
to go further than Lee in restricting the federal judicial power. Led by Samuel
Livermore, they wanted to eliminate federal district courts entirely from the
judiciary bill. Livermore argued that Congress could establish state courts
with admiralty jurisdiction.' These congressmen argued that state courts
could act with impartiality in dealing with all federal issues,'56 the Union had
survived (under the Continental Congress) for more than a decade without
such courts,' 57 and the Constitution did not absolutely require the creation
of inferior federal courts.' 58 James Jackson relied on the long familiarity of
the people with state courts. "[T]he harmony of the people," he contended,
"their liberties and properties, would be more secure under the legal paths of
that
A bill for constructing the Judiciary system, of the U. States is preparing in the
Senate, and I trust it will come forth in a spirit of moderation that will quiet the
apprehensions of many, whilst federal justice may be effectually administered thereby.
But we must not forget, 'that the liberties of the people are not so well secured by the
gracious manner, as by the limitations of power.[']
Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (May 10, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 390.
153. The Virginia ratifying convention in 1788 had proposed that the inferior courts of Article
III of the Constitution be limited to "such courts of admiralty as Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish in any of the different states." William Maclay Diary Entry (June 22,,
1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 409 n.2. Lee, from Virginia, apparently
felt bound by this restriction. See 4 id. (citing 3 THE DEBATES IN TH4E SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, AS THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 660, 661 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876)).
154. William Maclay Diary Entry (June 23, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
99, at 413. Since the debates in the Senate were not recorded, we have to rely on the elusive
diary entries of William Maclay.
155. 1 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS, 784, 796 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) [hereinafter ANNALS].
156. 1 id. at 784.
157. 1 id. at 797.
158. 1 id. at 802.
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their ancestors; under their modes of trial, and known methods of deci-
sion.'159 Michael Stone argued for a narrow construction of the Constitu-
tion. The new federal government "originated in necessity and it ought not be
carried further than necessity will justify."" 6  Stone argued that federal
district courts were not essential. Federal courts within the states would harass
the people, insisted Aedanus Burke. 6' James Jackson further proclaimed to
his fellow congressmen, "My heart, sir, is federal; and I would do as much
as any member on this floor, on any, and on every occasion, to promote the
interests and welfare of the Union." But Jackson concluded that he opposed
the federal district courts because "I conceive the liberties of my fellow-
citizens too deeply involved" to gamble on the creation of these new federal
courts in the states merely for greater efficiency. 62 Even while arguing for*
the most severe restriction on federal judicial power, Jackson felt it necessary
to assure his fellow congressmen that he was a federal man.
After extensive debate in the House, only eleven members out of forty-
two voted to eliminate the federal district courts from the judiciary bill. Thus,
the basic structure of the Senate bill remained intact.
Many outside of Congress who commented on the judiciary bill also
opposed the creation of federal district courts. State courts, they insisted,
should be trusted to hear most of the federal cases. For instance, Pierce
Butler wrote in his notes that federal courts would "Cut up at the Root... the
State Judiciaries . . . [and] Anhialate [sic] their whole system of Jurispru-
dence ... "163 Butler thought federal courts should have appellate
jurisdiction in all federal cases and original jurisdiction only for admiralty and
federal revenue cases.164 A prominent former judge and current governor
of Connecticut advised Ellsworth to work for a judiciary bill that would create
"a Spirit of. . .Candour & Harmony & Mutual Support, upon which the
Constitution Seems to be founded."" He cautioned against anything in the
bill that "appears like engrossing or absorbing the Government of the Several
States ... "166 For Huntington, as for most others, the proper federal
balance remained of the utmost importance. Another lawyer opposed the
vexations to ordinary citizens who would have to travel great distances to
defend their interests in a federal court.' 67 A newspaper published the
159. 1 id.
160. 1 ANNALS, supra note 155, at 809.
161. 1 id. at 811.
162. 1 id. at 829.
163. Pierce Butler's Notes for Remarks on Judiciary Bill (July 17, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 471.
164. 4 id. at 472.
165. Letter from Samuel Huntington to William S. Johnson and Oliver Ellsworth (April 30,
1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 383.
166. 4 id.
167. Letter from Robert T. Paine to Caleb Strong (May 18, 1789) in 4 DOCUMENTARY
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observations of one commentator who opposed the judiciary bill. He wrote
that "[tihe judicial powers vested in Congress are also so various and
extensive, that by legal ingenuity they may be extended to every case, and thus
absorb the state judiciaries. " 168
Another newspaper contributor contended that the entire federal judicial
system was based on "this indecent supposition, that the courts of the several
states have not spirit and integrity to do justice. "169 After all, a prominent
state judge observed, "Have we any Security that Judges of federal appoint-
ment, will possess Superior ability or Integrity, to those called into that duty
by the States?" 70 State judges took the same oath and looked to the same
law, but had the advantage of being close to the people.' A member of the
Senate committee, writing to a prominent lawyer, raised the question that was
implicit in numerous comments, "[W]hy not make [state courts] the inferior
federal Courts at once?" 
72
The Judiciary Act reflected agreement with or sensitivity to the wide-
spread fear of the unknown that was directed at the powerful federal district
courts. The Judiciary Act left vast areas of federal jurisdiction to be admin-
istered by state courts with appellate review by the Supreme Court. The
Senate committee showed considerable care in defining the jurisdiction of
federal district courts. The important point is that the grant of jurisdiction was
precisely limited, and even within these limits, the federal courts did not
always have exclusive jurisdiction. Federal district court jurisdiction,
therefore, consisted of precisely charted islands in the vast sea of state court
jurisdiction. The Senate committee was determined to assure the district court
boundaries intruded as little as possible into the domain of the state courts.
The district and circuit courts' jurisdiction over all federal crimes was
exclusive of the state courts. District courts could hear only the lesser federal
criminal cases while circuit courts had comprehensive jurisdiction over federal
crimes. But Congress hemmed in the grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction and authority over seizures under the federal navigation laws. The
seizure jurisdiction was divided between significant seizures and smaller ones.
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 393.
168. SAMUEL BRYAN, (CENTINEL REVIVED, No. 26), (Aug. 27, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 503. In the same contribution, Centinel added "[A]fter this sweeping
jurisdiction, added to its auxiliaries, what will remain for the state courts?--Nothing that can
prevent their being reduced to cyphers." 4 id. at 504.
169. A CITIZEN, (Nov. 19, 1791, published in DUNLAP'S AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER), in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 565, 566.
170. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (July 3, 1789), in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 444.
171. See 4 id.
172. Letter from William Maclay to Jared Ingersoll (July 4, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 449-50.
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The Act limited significant seizures to those made "on waters which are
navigable from the Sea by Vessels of ten or more tons burthen."17 The
admiralty, maritime, and seizure jurisdiction of federal district courts, howev-
er, was subject to an inscrutable exception protecting familiar state court
jurisdiction: "Saving to Suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law
remedy where the common law is competent to give it." 74 Thus, even in
the area where the widest consensus on jurisdiction for federal district courts
existed, the Senate committee carved out some space for state courts to
continue to operate as they had in the past. The committee could not speak
of concurrent jurisdiction, since states did not have admiralty courts. Instead
of simply granting the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, the committee left
open the possibility of suit in state courts of common law.
The judiciary bill also granted district courts exclusive jurisdiction over
"all seizures [under federal law] on land, or other waters" than those navigable
from the sea by vessels of ten tons.175 Presumably these would be lesser
seizures. The Senate did not make these lesser revenue seizures subject to the
"Saving to Suitors" clause.
The Senate bill gave district courts jurisdiction over cases "where an
Alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of Nations or a Treaty of the
United States."' 6 When this clause is situated in its historical context, it
seems the bill intended to allow suits by any alien (not just the ambassadors
or consuls covered by Supreme Court original jurisdiction) who had been
injured and sought recovery under international law or treaty obligations. It
clearly seems to exclude contract suits by aliens, such as British creditors."
Whatever the committee intended this grant of jurisdiction to mean, and
virtually no contemporary commentary exists on it in or out of the Congress,
federal courts did not have exclusive jurisdiction.
Federal district courts also received concurrent jurisdiction over suits at
common law brought by the United States. Not only did state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over these sensitive suits where the United States was
plaintiff, but federal district courts only had jurisdiction over these cases if the
jurisdictional amount of at least $100 was satisfied. Thus, the district courts
had no jurisdiction to hear actions brought by the United States seeking
equitable relief or for smaller common-law claims of less than $100. The
Senate committee did not want the United States to bring numerous civil suits
173. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, § 9, supra note 113, at 53, 54.
174. 4 id. at 54.
175. 4 id.
176. 4 id.
177. The most thorough historical analysis is by William R. Casto, The Federal Courts'
Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 467, 488-510 (1986). See also, KENNETH C. RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM, 34-38 (1990).
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in federal courts. The drafters did not give the district courts general
jurisdiction over any other common-law suits.
Finally, the federal district courts were given exclusive jurisdiction "of
all suits against Consuls or vice Consuls" unless the suit involved criminal
offenses of a more serious nature.' Under the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over "cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls."'7 9 The Senate committee felt justified in moving
the less important cases brought against consuls from the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to the district courts.
To respond to the many objections raised during the ratification debates,
the Senate committee assured jury trials for all civil and criminal cases in the
federal district courts, excepting only the admiralty and maritime cases.' 0
The Senate committee in crafting in Section 11 its most original creation,
the circuit courts, measured out with precise care the jurisdiction granted to
them. The circuit courts received broader trial court jurisdiction than the
district courts. But their jurisdiction was not exclusive. State courts had
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court over civil common-law or equity
suits with at least $500 as the amount in controversy."'8 Smaller suits could
be brought exclusively in state courts. The state courts also had concurrent
jurisdiction with the circuit courts over diversity suits where an alien, such as
a British creditor, was a party or where one of the parties was a citizen of
another state. '2 The circuit courts had jurisdiction over all federal
crimes. I
The state courts, therefore, retained significant jurisdiction over cases that
fit within the judicial power as defined in Article III. Jurisdictional grants to
lower federal courts came with narrow and exact metes and bounds. Despite
the Senate committee's careful definitions of the district courts' and circuit
courts' jurisdictional boundaries, the committee failed to mention one area of
original jurisdiction in Sections 9 or 11. The Senate committee did not grant
original jurisdiction to any lower federal courts over all cases arising under the
Constitution, federal laws, or treaties. Of course, many such federal question
cases were within the jurisdiction of federal trial courts, such as cases arising
under revenue laws or federal criminal laws. Subsequent federal statutes, such
as patent and copyright laws, did grant jurisdiction to federal courts for cases
which arose under those laws."4 But the fact remains that the Judiciary Act
178. JudiciaryAct of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, supra note 113, 53, 54. Apparently this was offered
by Ellsworth as an amendment to the original Senate bill. 4 id. at 55.
179. U.S. CONsT. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
180. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, supra note 113, at 54.
181. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, supra note 113, at 59.
182. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 59.
183. 4 id.
184. See David E. Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789 Judiciary Act, 14
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maintained silence about general federal question jurisdiction. In many cases
suits arising under federal laws, treaties or the Constitution could be brought
only in a state trial court, with appeals possible to the Supreme Court.
2. The Federal District Courts
In reading the records of the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, one
keeps a cocked ear to pick up the argument we, from our distant vantage
point, would have expected. But we search in vain. Few participants pointed
out that the judiciary, like the executive and the legislative branches, should
come into being fully clothed with the powers set out in the Constitution.'"
As a matter of fact, only occasionally in the entire debate did the participants
look seriously at the precise wording of Article III at all.' 86 During the
congressional debate, Edmund Randolph wrote to James Madison with
comments on the judiciary bill. He objected that "[t]he jurisdiction is
inartificially, untechnically and confusedly worded. Would it not have been
sufficient to have left this point upon the constitution itself?." 1  Another
correspondent pointed out that the federal judiciary would cost more than it
was worth. Even for a cost of $50,000 or so, "it will not extend to a tenth
part of the causes which might by the constitution come into the federal
court."188 The dictates of federalism, it seems, far more than the precise re-
quirements of Article III, guided the drafters of the Judiciary Act.
One congressman did rely on Article III of the Constitution in opposing
the group of representatives who sought to delete federal district courts from
the judiciary bill completely. William Smith of South Carolina insisted that
the language of Article III, "such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time
to time, establish," required Congress to establish some lower federal courts.
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 521, 532-33 (1989).
185. Samuel Osgood, it seems, was a rare exception. Early in the process of preparing the
judiciary bill, Osgood wrote to an unknown correspondent questioning whether Congress should
be able determine the scope of the federal judicial power. Instead, he claimed for the judiciary
full constitutional authority, "[H]ere are certain Powers vested by the Constitution itself-&
however inconvenient & oppressive they may be found to be; yet the Legislature cannot modify
or alter them." Letter by Samuel Osgood (Feb. 20, 1789), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 99, at 364.
186. A Virginia judge, Richard Parker expressed in a letter, apparently to Richard Henry Lee,
his general satisfaction with the judiciary bill. He added, "The framers of the Bill appear to have
taken great pains to make it as little exceptionable as possible and to have guarded against the
Mischiefs which many people dreaded from the Words of the Constitution." Letter from Richard
Parker to Richard Henry Lee (July 6, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at
452.
187. Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (June 30, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 432.
188. Paine Wingate, supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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He claimed that Congress had the power to determine how many and what
kinds of lower courts, but that it lacked the option of not creating any inferior
federal courts. I"9  This position certainly represented a minority view.
Nearly all the participants in the debate over the judiciary bill believed
Congress could choose whether to create lower federal courts, and they
believed Congress could give them a little, a lot, or all the powers enumerated
in Article III. The political process and the realities of federalism, therefore,
rather than the words of Article III of the Constitution, determined the size and
shape of lower federal courts.
As we have already seen, the core of the debate centered on whether state
courts should be used instead of creating federal trial courts. Some commenta-
tors looked to the constitutionally prescribed characteristics of federal
judges-tenure during good behavior and no decrease in salary-as a bar to
employing state judges to hear federal cases."9° This argument, as we have
seen, influenced Oliver Ellsworth in drafting the judiciary bill. After the
Senate had completed its initial action on the bill, Ellsworth explained to a
Connecticut judge that state judges lacked the judicial independence required
of federal judges and thus could not sit as federal judges. 9'
Beyond the constitutional argument, however, lay a more immediate
obstacle to using state judges entirely instead of federal judges. At least one
state, Virginia, had prohibited its judges from "executing federal func-
tions."" g  This problem made it impossible for the Senate committee to
189. Smith's words, referring to the language of Article III, were clear:
[l]t is a latitude of expression empowering Congress to institute such a number of
inferior courts, of such particular construction, and at such particular places, as shall
be found expedient; in short, in the words of the Constitution, Congress may establish
such inferior courts as may appear requisite. But that Congress must establish some
inferior courts is beyond a doubt.
I ANNALS, supra note 155, at 818.
190. See Robert T. Paine, supra note 167, at 392. Paine stated that
I find there is a difficulty in the minds of many in Constituting the State Supreme Jud
Courts for that purpose; it is Said the regulation must be general & that the S.J. Court
of every State do not hold quam diu: it certainly would Save much expense of time
& money if Such a regulation could take place.
4 id. at 393. See also, Letter from Caleb Strong to Nathaniel P. Sargeant (May 7, 1789) in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 387.
191. See letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law (August 4, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 495.
192. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (April 19, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 395. A member of the Senate committee, who opposed such a
resolution of the issue, expressed a basic reason for not turning over to the state courts the federal
judicial powers:
There is another [inconvenience]... [t]he State of Virginia by a Law passed since
their Adoption of the Constitution, have prohibited their Officers from holding Offices
under the United States, and their Courts from having Jurisdiction of Causes arising
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follow the advice of a few and simply turn over to state judges all the judicial
powers under the Constitution, with only the Supreme Court to assure some
uniformity of interpretation.
Federal district courts, therefore, were necessary because of the
constitutional argument and because of the practical difficulty of Virginia's
refusal to allow its judges sit as federal judges. Underlying these arguments,
however, was the deep suspicion some had of state courts. James Madison,
in the House debate on the judiciary bill, argued, as he had two years earlier
at the Philadelphia Convention, that the judicial power of the new government
must be commensurate with the executive and legislative departments. 93 He
insisted that in many states the courts could not be trusted to enforce federal
law. Some state courts, he told the Congress, "are so dependent on State
Legislatures, that to make the Federal laws dependent on them, would throw
us back into all the embarrassments which characterized our former situa-
tion" 94 under the Articles of Confederation. One lawyer expressed more
graphically the same distrust. He stated that it would be "little better than
madness... to adopt the state courts[.] It is delivering the Govt. bound hand
and foot to its' enemies to be buffeted[." 95 Another lawyer, Abiel Foster,
placed no confidence in state courts, which were utterly dependent on the state
governments, to enforce federal law.' 96 Foster argued the new government
under the Laws of the Union; by such Laws every State would be able to defeat the
Provisions of Congress if the Judiciary powers of the Genl. Government were
directed to be exercised by the State Courts[.]
Letter from Caleb Strong to Robert T. Paine (May 24, 1789) in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 99, at 395-96.
193. 1 ANNALS, supra note 155, at 812.
194. 1 id. at 813. One writer in a newspaper captured the essence of the argument Madison
would later use:
The simple self evident proposition, that the means ought ever to be commensurate
with the end designed, points out the need of a national judiciary; the inconveniences
and incompatibilities which must have necessarily resulted from the interpretation of
the national laws by the State judicial courts, the partial determinations to be feared
from juries so impanelled ... the strong bias of separate interests and views, are so
many sarcasms upon the idea [of allowing state courts act as lower federal courts.]
AMERICANUS, A SKETCH OF THE POLITICAL STATE OF AMERICA (June 10, 1789), in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 401-02.
195. Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (July 28, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 99, at 480, 482. Ames, in the same letter also stated that:
The idea of submitting to a foreign and hostile jurisdiction-as some of the state
courts will be, and, in time, perhaps, all of them-the important office of enforcing
and interpreting the Laws seems, a priori, awkward and improper ... The principal
difficulty the new Govt will have to experience is the opposition of the state powers.
4 id. at 481.
196. See Letter from Abiel Foster to Oliver Peabody (Sept. 23, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 515-16.
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must have a judicial system coextensive with the legislative power, and equally
as strong." 7  "[For of what avail are the wisest & most salutary Laws,
without a firm & unbiased judicial, to carry those Laws into effect?"' 8
Another lawyer simply brushed off most state courts as "a burlesque on
Justice[.]"' 9 Distrust of some of the state judiciaries, therefore, rather than
any intense belief in the desirability of powerful federal courts, influenced
Congress to create some carefully delineated federal trial courts. Federalism,
for the participants in this debate, remained a tension between two opposing
poles: enough authority in the central government to make it effective
without, at the same time, dismantling the state governmental powers.
Although cogent arguments were made for establishing "inferior federal
courts," the precise design and scope of these federal trial courts remained to
be settled. It appears that the narrow jurisdiction finally accorded the federal
district courts came about by Congress starting with a zero base and justifying
each additional grant of power. Few regarded Article III's description of the
judicial power as the relevant starting point. The political realities of a federal
union seem to have played a larger role.
Even those opposed to federal district courts in general conceded the need
for district courts with admiralty jurisdiction.2 ° The important concession
of the need for federal trial courts to hear at least admiralty cases opened the
door for somewhat broader jurisdiction, since it effectively surrendered the
argument over the expense of federal district courts. Another correspondent
wrote, "State-Courts, where they are well established might be adopted as the
inferior Federal Courts, except as to Maritime business."
20'
Probably many who were willing to concede the need for federal
admiralty courts were thinking primarily of courts, like those established
during the Revolutionary War, to determine the lawfulness of captures of
enemy vessels.' These prize cases often involved the rights of neutral
197. See 4 id.
198. 4 id.
199. John Lowell to Fisher Ames (Jan. 14, 1791), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
99, at 549. Fisher Ames had earlier written to John Lowell opposing the use of state courts as
lower federal courts.
200. Pierce Butler, supra note 165, at 472. Butler insisted his objections would not destroy
the federal judiciary. "I wou[lI]d give them Appellate Jurisdiction in all Cases, and Original in
Admiralty or Maritime Cases and on whatever related to the Collection of the Revenue of the
General Government." 4 id. On Butler's hostility to the federal judiciary, see William Maclay
Diary Entry (June 12, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 404.
201. Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 493.
202. See William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of
Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AMER. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 143-49 (1993). It is clear,
however, that some lawyers also thought of the the civil admiralty cases that could come before
federal district courts, such as cases of seamen's wages. See Letter from James Sullivan to
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nations and disputes between claimants from different states.2 3 Such cases
most obviously called for federal courts situated in the principal port cities of
each state. During the Revolutionary War, at the behest of the Continental
Congress, each state had established a court to determine the legality of the
prizes brought into its ports. Appeals were allowed to some judicial body set
up by the Continental Congress.' 4 Perhaps those who remembered the
experience with state prize courts had strongly negative recollections. Few
indeed in 1789, just a decade after the wartime experience with state prize
courts, thought it wise to repeat the mistake.
Federal district courts were granted jurisdiction over lesser federal crimes.
William Paterson, a member of the Senate committee, had argued most
cogently for this jurisdiction over federal crimes. He began with the broadly
stated principle that every community must "retain in its own Hands the
Powers of self preservation." 5 Patterson also argued that if state courts
had jurisdiction over lesser federal crimes, it would give the states a sword
that could destroy the federal government.
Congress also gave federal district courts jurisdiction over federal impost,
navigation or trade laws.206  A lawyer expressed the basic reason for
retaining jurisdiction in federal courts over these cases that involved federal
revenue. "It appears to me," he wrote, "indispensably necessary to have
district Judges who shall have jurisdiction of all Admiralty matters, and
whatever may in any way concern the Revenue." 7 Dana feared state courts
would become unpopular and have their impartiality questioned, if they dealt
with federal revenue cases.2"8 William Paterson was more blunt; he wrote:
"Do not give up the Power of collecting your own Revenue [or] you will
collect Nothing-The State Officers will feel it their Interest to consult the
Temper of the People of the State in which they live rather than that of the
Union. "209
Elbridge Gerry (March 29, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 372.
203. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 20, at 238-96.
204. Id. at 37-134.
205. William Paterson's Notes on Judiciary Bill Debate and William Paterson's Notes for
Remarks on Judiciary Bill (June 22, 1789), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 410,
411.
206. Judiciary Act § 9, supra note 113, at 53, 53.
207. Letter from Francis Dana to John Adams (July 31, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 99, at 489.
208.4 id. at 490-91.
209. William Paterson, supra note 205, at 411.
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3. The Circuit Courts
Although the district courts were given narrowly stated areas of
jurisdiction, the circuit courts, the other federal trial court, received broader
and more significant jurisdictional powers.
The most creative idea in the judiciary bill was the cross-breeding of the
district courts with the Supreme Court to give birth to three federal circuits.
The original districts where the district courts sat followed the boundaries of
the eleven states that had ratified the Constitution. Special provisions were
made for district courts of Maine and Kentucky, which were not yet states.
The original Senate bill divided the districts into three circuits, the eastern,
middle, and southern circuits.210 Twice a year each district would hold a
circuit court composed of two Supreme Court justices and the district judge of
the district where the circuit court was sitting.21'
The Senate committee borrowed the idea of itinerant Supreme Court
Justices from the British nisi prius courts, which for centuries had sent out the
judges of the central courts at Westminster to conduct jury trials throughout
the country. A number of the states had experimented in various ways with
traveling judges carrying the state judiciary to the local communities.
21 2
Because some members of the Senate objected to the possibility of a
district judge participating in appeals from his own decisions," 3 the senate
committee amended Section 4 to eliminate this problem.2 a
The circuit court must have been intended to be a traveling supreme
court. The circuit court could review only the more important admiralty
cases. The Senate bill imposed a $300 minimum amount in controversy
limitation on admiralty appeals to the circuit court. 215  A $50 minimum
amount in controversy limit was applied to other civil appeals.216 The
judiciary bill also permitted out-of-state defendants to remove a case from the
210. Original S.BilI, in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 45.
211. Judiciary Act § 4, supra note 113, at44, 44-45.
212. GOEBEL, supra note 19, at 472. In the debates a distinction was made between circuit
courts, as in the Ellsworth plan, and nisi prius courts. See William Maclay Diary (June 24,
1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 421. See also Holt, supra note 17, at
1493 (discussing this distinction more fully).
213. See Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (June 30, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 433-34; William Maclay Diary Entries (July 7-8, 1789), in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 453-54.
214. The Act was amended to read that "no district Judge shall give a vote in any case of
appeal or Error from his own decision, but may assign the reasons of such his decision."
Judiciary Act § 4, supra note 113, at 44, 45. However, Supreme Court Justices who decided a
case on circuit were not prohibited from participating if the case should be appealed to the
Supreme Court.
215. Judiciary Act § 21, supra note 113, at 78.
216. Judiciary Act § 22, supra note 113, at 79.
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state court to the circuit court where diversity of citizenship existed and the
matter in dispute was more than $500.21 The most important restriction was
a $2000 amount-in-controversy limit for appeals from the circuit court to the
Supreme Court.21 Thus, for the vast majority cases within the circuit
court's jurisdiction, it was the court of last resort.
The essential aim of creating these itinerant supreme courts was to "carry
Law to their Homes, to their very Doors."29 The Senate committee grasped
the widespread sentiment that individuals should not have to travel great
distances in order to protect their rights. "[Tihe Vexations of carrying a Dft
to answer at a distance may amount to a greater Oppression to individuals than
any we expect the Resolution to deliver us from." ° The creation of the
federal judiciary required "the lenient touch of Congress[,] To quiet the fears
of the Citizens of being drag'd large distances from home, to defend a suit for
a small sum.""' Furthermore, riding circuit would be educational for the
Supreme Court Justices. "I think the Superiour. Judges can acquire a
knowledge of the rights of the people of these States much better by riding the
circuit, than by Staying at home and reading. British and other foreign
Laws. "'
The circuit court's civil jurisdiction was made concurrent with the states,
allowing plaintiffs to choose their forum. The court, however, had no civil
jurisdiction at all unless the amount in controversy exceeded $500. The circuit
court, unlike the district courts, had jurisdiction of suits in equity as well as
common law suits. The United States, an alien, or a citizen of another state
were the three types of plaintiffs that could bring civil suits in the circuit
courts. The judiciary bill made it clear that diversity of citizenship could not
be artificially created by assigning the subject matter of the suit to a citizen of
a different state.'
Not much of the debate over the circuit court's jurisdiction remains in the
preserved record. One lawyer strongly suggested to Oliver Ellsworth that the
diversity jurisdiction was unnecessary and that the jurisdictional amount should
be increased by adding a zero to the sum the committee settled on. 4 Many
217. Judiciary Act § 12, supra note 113, at 63. Removal by a citizen in a diversity case had
to be brought in the state where the suit was pending.
4 id.
218. Judiciary Act § 22, supra note 113, at 79-80.
219. William Paterson, supra note 205, at 411.
220. Robert T. Paine, supra note 168, at 393.
221. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (July 3, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 444.
222. Letter from Roger Sherman to Simeon Baldwin (Jan. 21, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 550-51.
223. See Judiciary Act § 11, supra note 113, at 59.
224. Letter from Robert R. Livingston to Oliver Ellsworth (June 24, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTA-
19951
45
Bourguignon: The Federal Key to the Judiciary Act of 1789
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
people, however, saw the wisdom of allowing aliens to bring their significant
disputes before the circuit courts. "[I]f foreigners Should have injustice done
them in the State Courts they will think very hard of having no remedy in the
general Government. " ' Oliver Ellsworth also supported diversity jurisdic-
tion. William Smith, a member of the House of Representatives, discussed the
Senate bill with Ellsworth and reported that Ellsworth
[O]bserved that the convention had in view the condition of foreigners
when they framed the Judicial of the U. States. The Citizens were already
protected by [the State] Judges & Courts, but foreigners were not. The
Laws of nations & Treaties were too much disregarded in the several
States-Juries were too apt to be biassed ag[ain]st them, in favor of their
own citizens & acquaintances: it was therefore necessary to have general
Courts for causes in w[hi]ch foreigners were parties or citizens of
diff[erenjt States.226
Diversity suits, therefore, whether brought by aliens or by citizens of
another state seem to have been accepted by the Senate committee as an
appropriate justification for the circuit courts. Clearly the larger suits by
British creditors would be within circuit court jurisdiction. These diversity
suits had an explicit basis in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The
Judiciary Act, however, imposed a minimum $500jurisdictional amount on the
circuit court's jurisdiction even for these diversity suits, and thus, the states
had exclusive jurisdiction over the numerous suits involving less than $500 as
well as concurrent jurisdiction over the larger suits.
The propriety of federal jurisdiction over federal crimes has already been
discussed in the context of the district court's jurisdiction.' If it would
violate the principle of self preservation to allow state courts to hear the lesser
criminal cases within the district court's jurisdiction, then most assuredly it
would violate the same principle to turn over to the states the more serious
federal criminal violations.
The debate over equity jurisdiction of the circuit courts led to diametrical-
ly opposed positions. Some suggested that equity jurisdiction should be added
to the powers of the district courts. Since the district court jurisdiction would
consist largely of cases of admiralty and seizures, one observer commented,
it might be difficult to attract "a man of real talents" to sit as a judge.22 It
RY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 420.
225. Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (March 29, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 372.
226. Letter from William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9-10, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTA-
Ry HISTORY, supra note 99, at 496, 498-99.
227. See supra pp. 689-90.
228. Letter from William Bradford, jr. to Elias Boudinot, (June 30, 1789) in 4 DOCUMENTARY
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would be wise therefore to add to the district court's jurisdiction smaller
"cases in equity & at law... [to] secure a person of consequence to fill this
post & ease the Circuit Judges who seem to have an accumulation of Business
far beyond a common portion of industry to dispatch."2 9 This was a
minority opinion. Most commentators opposed uniting admiralty, common law
and equitable powers in the same person 30 Some, however, were hostile
to the district courts having any equitable jurisdiction because they believed
it "had encroached greatly on the Common Law."' On the other hand, a
few lawyers insisted that common law and equity courts were "indispensably
necessary to the due Administration of Justice[,]" but should be in different
courts. 2
The different experiences in the various states, as well as the near worship
of the sacred right of jury trials, probably accounted for the divergent attitudes
toward equitable jurisdiction. In the end the Judiciary Act, as in so many
other issues, revealed a compromise. District courts would have no equitable
jurisdiction, and the equity powers of the circuit courts would remain barred
"in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at
law."' 3  Common law proceedings were clearly preferred. Furthermore,
when the circuit court acted as a court of equity, it would have "to cause the
facts on which they found their Sentence or decree, fully to appear upon the
Record" 4 as in a common law court. Finally, the Senate bill answered the
objection of those who opposed equity courts because "the proof of facts is by
the Examination of Witnesses in private."235 The Judiciary Act made the
practice of taking testimony identical in common law, equity, and admiralty
cases. " 6 Equity jurisdiction did not survive in the district courts, and in the
circuit courts it survived only with some of the appendages of common-law
practice.
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 430.
229. 4 id.
230. Letter from Nathaniel Freeman, Jr. to John Quincy Adams (July 1, 1789), in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 435. See also Letter from Samuel Chase to Richard
Henry Lee (July 2, 1789), id. at 439; Letter from Elbridge Gerry to John Wendell (Sept. 14,
1789), id. at 509.
231. Letter from William Maclay Diary Entry (July 13, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 99, at 462-63.
232. Letter from Samuel Chase to [Richard Henry Lee] (July 16, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 468-70.
233. Judiciary Act § 16, supra note 113, at 73.
234. Judiciary Act § 19, supra note 113, at 76.
235. Samuel Chase, supra note 232, at 470.
236. Section 30 stated that "the mode of proof by oral testimony and examination of Witnesses
in open Court shall be the same in all the Courts of the United States, as well in the trial of
causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as of actions at common law."
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The glaring omission in the jurisdiction of the circuit courts was the
failure to grant judicial power over all "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority."237 Some members of the
Senate committee did call for adding this jurisdiction to the inferior federal
courts. When Richard Henry Lee proposed restricting district courts to
admiralty jurisdiction, William Maclay apparently rose to insist that the
Constitution extended the judicial power to cases arising under the Constitu-
tion, federal laws and treaties. He said, "These [powers] must be executed by
the federal Judiciary."23 William Paterson made the same point in that
debate. "We must have Tribunals of our own pervading every State, operating
upon every Object of a national Kind. "' Lee apparently replied that "State
Judges would be all Sworn to support the Constitution. That they must obey
their Oath. and of course execute the Federal laws[.]" 240 Lee's position
ultimately prevailed.
Several individuals outside Congress likewise raised the propriety of
granting federal question jurisdiction to federal circuit or district courts. One
insisted to a member of the Senate committee that "[T]here must be federal
Courts to try all matters that are of a federal nature."24' A writer in a
newspaper asserted "The perfect propriety of having a national judiciary to
interpret the laws made by a national legislature."242 A lawyer raised the
question "[W]hether any Courts but those of the Union or such as may be
authorized by a Legislative Act thereof can take cognizance of Cases arising
under the laws of the Union[.]J 2 43
An oversight cannot explain the omission of general federal question
jurisdiction from the judicial powers granted to the district courts or the circuit
courts. Since the district courts were viewed as little more than admiralty
courts and lacked general common law or equity jurisdiction, there was little
likelihood that general federal question jurisdiction would be granted to them.
The circuit courts, however, would seem to have been the ideal courts to
237. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
238. William Maclay Diary Entry (June 22, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
99, at 409.
239. William Paterson, supra note 205, at 411. See also William Paterson's Notes for Remarks
on Judiciary Bill (June 23, 1789), id. at 414, 416, and [June 24-27, 1789], id. 421, 422.
Paterson's notes of his comments for debate are fully analyzed in Casto, supra note 99, at 1107-
17.
240. William Maclay Diary Entry (June 23, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
99, at 413.
241. Robert T. Paine, supra note 167, at 392.
242. "AMERICANUS," A SKETCH OF THE POLITICAL STATE OF AMERICA (June 10, 1789),
reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, 401-02.
243. Letter from George Read, Jr. to George Read (after Sept. 28, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 520.
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receive this important area of jurisdiction, but they did not. Revenue cases and
federal criminal cases were within the jurisdiction of federal trial courts. But
other cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws and treaties could only
be brought originally in state courts, unless the parties had different citizenship
or the United States was the plaintiff. This enormous concession of federal
judicial power to the often distrusted state courts must have been the
expression of a compromise or a consensus of those drafting the bill. Most
of the circuit courts' civil jurisdiction would be based on the status of the
parties (diversity) and not on the subject matter of the dispute (federal
question). Citizens of the same state with disputes that arose under the
Constitution, federal laws, or treaties could look only to state courts for initial
relief. The drafters of the judiciary bill, however, recognized the need for
some uniformity of judicial decisions. These state court decisions on cases
involving federal questions, therefore, could be appealed in most cases to the
Supreme Court. The next Section focuses on this question.
4. The Supreme Court
Four sections of the Judiciary Act dealt with the Supreme Court, but the
last section calls for the fullest comment since it focused on the power of the
Supreme Court to review judgments of the state courts. Because the
Constitution explicitly required the Supreme Court as the minimum repository
of the federal judicial power, no debate took place on the specifications of its
personnel, procedures, and processes.
Section 1 of the Act merely established the number of Justices on the
Supreme Court, five Justices and bne Chief Justice, and the number needed for
a quorum, four.2" Section 1 also prescribed the time and place where the
Court would hold its two annual sessions. 245
Section 13 looked to Article III, Section 2 to establish the boundaries of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. But the Senate drafters of the bill
did not feel constrained by the exact terms of the Constitution. The Constitu-
tion stated that "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction."246 The Senate committee ignored the "In
all Cases" language. The Supreme Court was not given original jurisdiction
in suits "between a State and its Citizens."247 The Court was not given
exclusive original jurisdiction for suits "between a State and Citizens of other
States or Aliens" and "suits brought by Ambassadors, or other public
244. Judiciary Act § 1, supra note 113, at 38.
245. 4 id.
246. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
247. Judiciary Act § 13, supra note 113, at 69.
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Ministers, or in which a Consul or Vice-Consul shall be a party."248 In the
other situations covered by the Constitution, the Supreme Court would have
exclusive original jurisdiction. Once again we see that the Senate committee
did not consider itself bound by the precise terms of the Constitutional grant
of power; undoubtedly, the committee was influenced by the statement in
Article III that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was subject to "such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."249
At least some observers thought Congress lacked the power to convert any
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to appellate jurisdiction." 0 The
Senate probably imposed these restrictions on the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction because of the obvious difficulties of travel to the seat of
government for a trial before the Supreme Court. Concurrent jurisdiction in
the lower federal courts or in the state courts would give the plaintiff the
option of bringing the suit closer to home."
Section 22 of the Judiciary Act established tie amount-in-controversy
limits for appeals. We have already seen that the circuit courts could review
district court decrees in civil cases only if the amount in dispute was greater
than $50. Circuit court decrees, however, could be reviewed by the Supreme
Court only if "the matter in dispute exceeds the sum. . . of Two thousand
Dollars." 2 The Senate bill clearly intended the federal circuit courts to
have effective finality in the vast majority of cases within their jurisdiction.
The Senate committee imposed no amount-in-controversy limitation for
the Supreme Court's appellate review of state court decisions. The Supreme
Court could review the smallest cases decided by the state courts in the
exercise of the state courts' jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitu-
tion, federal law or treaties. The original draft of Section 25 remained
unchanged through the legislative process except for small verbal alter-
ations . 5 3 For a section of the bill so potentially controversial, this lack of
attempts to amend is quite surprising.
248. 4 id.
249. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
250. See letter from Arthur Lee to Tench Coxe (April 24, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 380; letter from John Dickinson to George Read (June 24, 1789), id
at 419. Edmund Randolph apparently thought that Congress lacked the power to restrict any of
the jurisdictional power granted by the Constitution. "Will the courts be bound by any definition
of authority, which the constitution does not in their opinion warrant?" Letter from Edmund
Randolph to James Madison (June 30, 1789), id. at 432.
251. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (July 3, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, 444, 447.
252. Judiciary Act § 22, supra note 113, 79-80.
253. Original S. Bill, in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 86. The draft of § 25,
at it was finally enacted, must have been completed early in the legislative process. By April 24
the contents were accurately described in Ralph Izard's letter to Edward Rutledge. 4 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 377.
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Some lawyers did comment in general on whether there should be some
amount-in-controversy limitations on Supreme Court review of the state courts.
Edmund Pendleton went to the heart of the issue. He objected to the lack of
any amount-in-controversy limitation since every British creditor could "drag
every D[ebto]r for the most trifling sum first thro' the State Courts & then by
Appeal to the seat of Congress." 4 Another lawyer also saw the need for
a restriction of appeals of small suits. He agreed a Supreme Court was essen-
tial and should not be stationary because of the great distances parties would
have to travel to appear before it. 5 He felt that one jury trial should suffice
unless there was a legal basis for granting a new trialY. 6  He thought,
however, that federal jurisdiction should be "as much Contracted as possible,
and no matters of small moment should ever Come before the S[upreme]
J[udiciary] unless such as must from their Nature there Originate[.]"" 7
Another lawyer made the same point: "I think the fed[eral] Sup[reme] Jud[ic-
iary] will be Itinerant & the trial of Appealed Causes So regulated as to
prevent as much as may be the expense and burthen of going far from home
for Justice.""8 This view prevailed for appeals from the federal circuit
courts, but not for appeals from "a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the
highest Court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could
be had." 9
Although the point came up on a different issue in the Senate debate,
William Paterson's notes indicate that someone (perhaps Paterson himself) had
reminded the Senate that "a small Sum. . .may involve a Question of Law
of great Importance."2 6 The speaker revived the Senate members' attention
by invoking the famous ship money case involving John Hampden's refusal in
the seventeenth century to pay twenty shillings in tax for support of the king's
war. 6' Apparently just such an argument prevailed, and the Senate accepted
Supreme Court review of state court decisions without any minimum amount
in controversy. Shortly after the Senate amended the bill and the House of
Representatives approved it, James Madison used this exact point in explaining
why the proposed bill of rights amendments could not be changed. He wrote,
"It will be impossible I find to prevail on the Senate to concur in the limitation
on the value of appeals to the Supreme Court, which they say is unnecessary,
254. Edmund Pendleton, supra note 251, at 448.
255. Letter from David Sewall to George Thatcher (April 11, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 374.
256. 4 id.
257. 4 id.
258. Robert T. Paine, supra note 167, at 393.
259. Judiciary Act § 25, in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 113, at 85.
260. William Paterson's Notes on Judiciary Bill Debate, (June 24-27, 1789), in 4 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 421-22.
261. 4 id.
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and might be embarrassing in questions of national or constitutional impor-
tance in their principle, tho' of small pecuniary amount."
262
Although Congress imposed no monetary limit on review of state court
cases by the Supreme Court, the Judiciary Act did attempt to limit them in
another manner. The language of the Act is complex, but basically the Senate
bill sought to restrict Supreme Court review of state court judgments to those
cases in which the state court had decided against the federal claim or right
that had been asserted. 263  A few people objected to this limitation. They
thought that the right of appellate review should be reciprocal; that either party
should be able to obtain Supreme Court review of a state court decision on a
federal issue. Just because the state court upheld the asserted federal claim did
not prove that the state court was correct.26 James Jackson, an astute oppo-
nent of the Senate bill in the House of Representatives, insisted this clause did
not impose any limits on appeals of state court judgments to the Supreme
Court. He told his colleagues in the House, "I am convinced experience will
prove [that] there will not, neither can there be any suit or action brought in
any State courts, but may, under this clause, be reversed or affirmed by being
brought within the cognizance of the Supreme Court. "265
The clear intent of the Senate bill, however, was to limit the right of
access to the Supreme Court. William Smith, a member of the House of
Representatives, best captured the reasoning behind this clause. The Senate
262. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, 517. Madison is clearly replying to the points raised by Pendleton in
his letter of July 3, 1789. See supra text at note 251.
263. The language of Section 25 provided that the Supreme Court could review state court
judgments only,
[W]here is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority
exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where
is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any
State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity; or where is
drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty or
statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the
title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under
such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission....
Judiciary Act § 25, supra note 255, at 85.
264. Edmund Pendleton raised this point in his comments on Section 25: "If an improper
Judgm[en]tis given in favfo]r of the Preference to foedral treaty or laws, the party injured should
have the same right to App[ea]l as the other, in case of a Contrary Judgm[en]t, otherwise the
remedy is Partial." Edmund Pendleton, supra note 251, at 448.
265. ANNALS, supra note 155, at 815. The astuteness of Jackson's comments appears from
considering the debate today over the scope of Article III and of the Judiciary Act of 1789. One
commentator has concluded that "in virtually every case in which a state court errs in
adjudicating a federal law, appellant can plausibly package her claim of error as one deriving
from a violation of her own federal 'right, privilege, or exemption' under the precise language
of section 25." Amar, supra note 105, at 1530.
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did not want the right to appeal to the Supreme Court from state courts to be
reciprocal. As Smith expressed it,
The reason on w[hi]ch the Clause is grounded is that a citizen can't
complain if his own State Court decides ag[ain]st him; that this Bill does
not put him in that respect in a worse plight than he was before: on the
other hand the Clause is absolutely necessary for the preservation of The-
federal governm[en]t. 266
Smith's final point, regarding the absolute necessity of Supreme Court
review of state court judgments "for the preservation of The federal govern-
m[en]t," was frequently repeated in the observations made on the Senate bill.
The need for uniformity of decisions on issues of federal law lay at the heart
of the argument for Supreme Court review of the state courts. The federal
government could hardly prosper if its Constitution, treaties, and laws had
different meanings and applications in various states. As one lawyer suggested
to a member of the Senate committee,
A certain uniformity of decisions throughout the united States,
Whether in the federal or State Courts, is an object that may be Worthy
of Consideration .... The Writs of Error should lie from these several
Courts to the S[upreme] J[udiciary] of the U.S. in all Causes of a federal
kind to a Certain amount, within a limited time[.] 267
Uniformity of federal law seemed to take on a mystical meaning for some.
William Paterson argued in the Senate debate that "To become one Peo-
ple-We must have one common national Tribunal-hence Uniformity of
Decision-hence a bond of Union-we shall approximate to each other
gradually-be assimilated in Manners, in Laws, in Customs[.]"26  Oliver
Walcott, a friend and the lieutenant governor of Connecticut, commented
favorably to Oliver Ellsworth on the draft of the Senate bill he had reviewed.
He thought the bill was well devised to secure impartial and uniform decisions
by the federal judiciary.269 A member of the House who argued vigorously
against the creation of any federal district courts reminded the other members
266. Letter from WilliamL. Smith to Edward Rutledge, (Aug. 9-10,1789), in 4 DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 496, 498.
267. Letter from David Sewall to Caleb Strong (March 28, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 369-70. See also letter from Richard Law to Oliver Ellsworth (May
4, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 386.
268. William Paterson's Notes for Remarks on Judiciary Bill, supra note 205, at 416. It is not
clear whether this passage in his notes refers specifically to the Supreme Court or to the whole
federal judicial system.
269. Letter from Oliver Wolcott, Sr. to Oliver Ellsworth (June 27, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 423.
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that the state court decisions would be subject to Supreme Court review to
remove the divisiveness of divergent state judgments. He stated that
[i]t has been said in this debate, that the State Judges would be partial, and
that there were no means of dragging them to justice. Shall I peremptorily
tell the gentlemen who hold this opinion, that there is a Constitutional
power in existence to call them to account. Need I add that the Supreme
Federal Court will have the right to annul these partial adjudications?
270
The participants all agreed uniformity of decisions on questions of federal
law and constitutional or treaty interpretation would be essential. Therefore,
the Supreme Court must be able to review all judgments of the highest state
court acting on the case and deciding against the federal interest. Under the
Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court could have been effectively fragmented into
three virtually final circuit courts. An effective Supreme Court, however, was
needed to hold a fragile Union's legal system together because the often
refractory state courts alone could initially determine many cases arising under
the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties. Section 25 marks the final element
of the federal compromise that made the federal judiciary possible.
V. CONCLUSION
The principles of federalism permeated the Judiciary Act of 1789. Of
course, for the leading members of the political community, federalism was
a bi-polar tension in society. The leaders who conceived, discussed, and
completed the Judiciary Act of 1789 understood the divisions in society. On
the one hand was the conviction that there must be an effective union of the
states in a new government, with an effective judiciary to complete the
tripartite governmental structure. But at the same time there was the
conviction that the long familiar states must not be swallowed up and that the
local, accessible state courts must continue to be trusted with most judicial
proceedings.
Far more important than the external federalism that was reflected in the
major debates of the day was the federalism within. Many individuals within
themselves felt tugged in two directions, more in one way for some and more
the other way for others. Most of the participants in the discussions over the
Judiciary Act seem to have shared a similar ambivalence. Although they saw
the need for an effective national government because of what many viewed
as widespread abuses by the state legislatures, they had at least a little and
often much apprehension about powerful federal courts intruding into the
states. Although the participants might have had strong suspicions about the
270. ANNALS, supra note 155, at 830.
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competence and fairness of the courts of many states to execute federal law,
they often felt a strong loyalty to the courts of their own states before which
they had practiced and which they basically trusted.." The tension of
federalism existed within the convictions and loyalties of most of the
participants in the debate. To express it another way, the debates over the
Judiciary Act do not reveal a pitched battle: firmly convinced nationalists
against die-hard states' rightists. Rather, in that brief period before the birth
of partisan politics, they were all federalists of varying shades and hues.
This underlying consensus is most clearly brought out by looking to two
participants who seemed to express the most extreme positions. William
Paterson argued most strenuously for federal courts with the fullest possible
judicial power. This, of course, was the same William Paterson who, two
years earlier, had sired the great compromise concerning representation in the
two houses of the federal legislature. This solution cannot be considered the
sign of an extreme nationalist. During the Senate debates, the same William
Paterson apparently said, "Must trust a great Deal to State Courts."
272
At the other extreme of federalism was Congressman Jackson, who during
the floor debate in the House joined in the fight to kill federal district courts.
But even he felt obliged to insist to his fellow congressmen, that "My heart,
sir, is federal; and I would do as much as any member on this floor, on any,
and on every occasion, to promote the interests and welfare of the Un-
ion."273 These two examples of the extreme positions in the debate seem to
reveal individuals with divided hearts. On one hand, they wanted to protect
their familiar state institutions, while all too aware of the abuses and
inadequacy of the state governments, and on the other hand they wanted a
more effective union of the states in the new federal government but feared
that a powerful federal authority might completely absorb the states.
This federalism revealed itself throughout the Judiciary Act. State
boundaries were followed in establishing districts for the new federal courts.
State procedures and state common law were imposed upon the federal courts
hearing cases in the states. The restricted jurisdiction of the district and circuit
courts reflected a desire not to overwhelm or subdue the state courts. The
grant to state courts of maximum concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
271. See, for example, letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (July 28, 1789) and the
Enclosure, in which Ames complained on the one hand that "The principal difficulty the new
Govt will have to experience is the opposition of the state powers." Later he scornfully asked,
"Shall we trust all the Several state courts?" But in the same discussion he insisted, "I am not
willing to make our excellent Court in Mass[achuse]tts subordinate." 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 99, at 480-81.
.272. William Paterson's Notes on Judiciary Bill Debate (June 24-27, 1789) in 4 DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY, supra note 99, at 421-22. It is possible that Paterson recorded these words from
the speech of some other participant in the debate.
273. ANNALS, supra note 155, at 829.
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courts and of exclusive jurisdiction over most cases arising under federal law,
treaties and the Constitution reflected a trust, perhaps reluctant for some, of
the state courts in dealing with important federal suits of their own citizens.
At every point in the drafting and debate over the Judiciary Act there
seems to have been an attempt to fine-tune the delicate balance between state
and federal judicial authority. Despite opposition, federal district courts were
created, but their jurisdiction was limited to admiralty and a few other
relatively insignificant areas that state courts had never exercised or could not
appropriately exercise. Circuit courts were necessary primarily in cases where
the state courts could not be trusted to be fair to foreign or out-of-state
litigants. Even in these sensitive cases, state courts had exclusive jurisdiction
of the numerous suits involving less than $500 and concurrent jurisdiction of
the larger cases. In dealing with their own citizens, state courts retained the
exclusive power of hearing cases that arose under the federal Constitution,
federal law, and federal treaties. But because of the need for uniformity of
decisions, the Supreme Court received the power to review all state court
judgments adverse to the federal right or interest asserted.
Such was the federal compromise at the heart of the Judiciary Act of
1789. Neither pole of the bi-polar tension of federalism was ignored. Some
aspects of the Judiciary Act were also influenced by the widespread acceptance
of the world view of republicanism. Because lawyers dominated the debates
and drafting of the Act, the common law as they understood it played an
important role. But ultimately, the Judiciary Act of 1789 cannot be under-
stood without a clear insight into what federalism meant to the participants.
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